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ABSTRACT

Author: Schultz, John P. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: Revisiting Rustow: An Empirical Assessment of the Relationship between National Identity
and Attitudes towards Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia
Major Professor: Dr. James McCann

Does national identity influence a country’s prospects for democratization? Brudny and
Finkel (2011) contend that national identity explains variation in the political developments among
former Soviet states. In considering this argument, this effort examines the empirical evidence to
determine 1) whether a measurable model of national identity has developed within Russia, 2) how
this national identity has developed over time, and 3) whether a relationship exists between this
intersubjectively held conception of national identity and attitudes towards democracy. Findings
suggest the development and ongoing contestation of two competing conceptions of national
identity that covary with changing attitudes towards democracy over time. This supports prior
research suggesting a purposively distinctive conceptualization of democracy that prioritizes
stability over liberty at a foundational level (Hale 2011). Consistent with social identity theory and
Eckstein’s (1966) congruency theory, this research adds to the knowledge derived from the
intersection of political psychology, political culture, and democratization, while providing
evidence to support the theoretical linkage between psychological mass tendencies and systemic
institutional properties.

1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Rustow’s Hypothesis and the context of Russia
Does national identity influence democratization? In 1970, Dankwart Rustow posited an

explicit relationship between national identity and democratization. His articulation held that a
coherent sense of national unity was the only necessary precondition to successful democratization.
This congruence between a sense of belonging amongst the national polity, and their attitudes
towards the state was required to facilitate both the formal and informal practices that reflect the
workings of a democracy, i.e. democratic consolidation. Stated simply, this national identity-based
explanation posits that before a society at large can institutionalize and routinize democratic
customs and practices for its people, knowing who ‘the people’ that are to be governed is
paramount (Jennings 1956; Rustow 1970).
How did I arrive at this question? The first piece of the puzzle appeared just over 20 years
ago when- as a student in Alaska- I became intrigued by the pronouncements of Vladimir
Zhirinovsky who campaigned for President of Russia on the platform of reconstituting the Russian
Empire (including the reclamation of Alaska) with nuclear force if needed! My initial reaction was
to dismiss such proclamations as the typical ravings of a fringe candidate. But then I discovered
that the Zhirinovsky-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)- generally characterized as a hypernationalist political party- held a plurality of seats in the Russian Duma. Recognizing that such
statements, fringe though they may seem- actually had the potential to translate into some
semblance of potential viability, I then became intrigued by the broader question: what could help
to explain why acceptance of such a fundamentally extreme and seemingly anti-democratic posture
held by political elites could ever be accepted as a possibility by the citizens of Russia?
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This time period surrounding the 1996 Presidential elections was less than five years from
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia had liberalized quickly, and the country was still
experiencing the growing pains associated with its adoption of democratic electoral procedures as
well as the ‘shock therapy’ privatization of its economy. It seemed easy to excuse minor mis-stepsafter all, the trappings of American democracy had been in place for over 200 years and it seemed
that at times it was still working out the kinks. That the Russian people were still drawn to
politicians who promised strength and stability at the expense of democratic ideals was
understandable. Ultimately the people selected Boris Yeltsin in the runoff for the 1996 presidential
election, Zhirinovsky’s LDP party lost power and prominence, and the question seemed to be how
long it would take Russia’s democracy to consolidate. The 1990’s was a great decade indeed.
At the end of 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned suddenly and appointed Vladimir Putin as
Acting President of the Russian Federation. Putin won election outright the following year with
53% of the popular vote. He won re-election in 2004 with 72% of the popular vote. It seemed that
perhaps Russia was ready to consolidate its democracy. Elections were seemingly free and fair,
confirming an exceedingly competent President presiding over a resurgent export-based economy
buoyed by high oil and commodity prices, which served to reverse a good deal of the economic
misfortune that had plagued the country throughout the 1990’s.
Yet there was a serious lingering question of ‘who are the Russian people?’ and ‘what it
means to be Russian?’ thanks in large part to the legacy of Soviet-era ‘nationalities policies’ which
served to directly foster nationalist sentiments among non-Russian minority groups within the
Soviet Union while indirectly conflating Russian-ness with Soviet-ness. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, non-Russians generally recognized- and worked to foster- their non-Russian, (and
now non-Soviet) sense of titular national identification (e.g. Ukrainians wrestling with what it
means to be distinctly Ukrainian once free from the top-down imposition of what it meant to be a
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‘good’ Soviet citizen). However, the question of Russian national identity was much trickier to
resolve.
One thing that was not in question was the incredible popular support maintained by
Vladimir Putin. The Russian people have seemingly thrown their lot in with Putin, and what has
occurred is the consolidation of Putin’s vision for Russia’s future, as well as the political power
(deriving from popular sovereignty) necessary to strive towards that vision. Perhaps no better
example exists to illustrate this point than the people’s acceptance of- if not outright support forPutin’s transference of presidential powers to the position of prime minister and back to the
presidency, effectively circumventing the statutory obstacle of presidential term limits. And over
time, this continuing popular support increasingly corresponds with explicit appeals to the
fundamental nature of who the Russian people are, via oppositionally divisive identifications of
who the Russian people are not. It is possible that Putin effectively elicited an answer to the general
question of Russian-ness which not only prevented the consolidation of democratic norms, but
also served to consolidate unchecked political power. If evidence is found to support the existence
of a coherent sense of national identity, future research efforts could assess to what extent this
sense was influenced by intentional elite-driven efforts to successfully exploit the institutional
weakness of Russia’s fledgling democracy. But that is research for a different day.
Returning to the primary question of whether national identity influences democratization,
some scholars have explicitly argued that such a relationship between national identity and
democratization exists. Brudny and Finkel (2011) contend that national identity explains the
difference in post-communist political development within Ukraine and Russia. However as
persuasive as their argument is made, the empirical evidentiary support for said argument is
suspect. This is where this research project comes in. This effort seeks to answer the following: is
there empirical evidence to suggest a relationship between Russian national identity and
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democratization (Chapter 5)? In order to test this, one must first address what national identity ‘is’
within the particular country context of Russia, and how to appropriately assess and model Russian
national identity. And assuming national identity does exist within a particular country context, is
this conception of identity static or is it possible for national identity conceptions to change over
time (Chapter 4)? This in turn requires distinguishing national identity from other politically
relevant bases of group identification (Chapter 3), following a consultation of the extant literature
(Chapter 2).

1.2

Democratization, Political Culture, and Trust
Democratization refers to the process by which a country transitions from a non-democracy

to a democracy. While traditional democratization scholarship was often pre-occupied with the
identification of necessary and sufficient conditions, most contemporary scholars now eschew
such characterizations in favor of facilitating and/or obstructing factors (Shin 1994).Within
contemporary literature, most approaches to democratization are now framed in terms of transition
and subsequent consolidation. An alternative way of understanding these approaches derive from
the question being asked. If you don’t have democracy and want to know what’s missing or
preventing a democratic transition from taking place (i.e. how do you get there?), the research is
focusing on transition. If you have ‘democracy’ and are questioning what makes it stick (i.e. how
do you stay there?), the research is dealing with consolidation.
There are a number of explanatory camps that address how countries are able to transition
from a nondemocratic to a democratic regime type, and what conditions are necessary for
maintaining/consolidating a democratic regime type once achieved. Broadly speaking, such
theories can be classified as agency-based and structural-based explanations. More specifically,
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such explanations often center around three major camps: socio-economic, historical institutional
and political culture.
Within this latter camp political culture research addresses its role in “the emergence,
survival, and development of democracy”. Prominent democratization scholars such as Larry
Diamond and Robert Putnam have argued that “the evolution of democratic political culture is a
key factor in the consolidation of democracy, and [this is] why the consolidation phase usually
takes decades or even generations to run its course” (Shin 1994, 145-146). Within these
discussions lies the notion of civil society. Harkening back to Enlightenment-era thinkers in the
18th century, theorists sought the foundations of societatis civilis- better conceived of as the “wellgoverned society” or the “civil state.” (Foley and Hodgkinson 2003) With the emergence of the
modern civil society tradition, civil society came to signify society apart from the state, rather than
the whole of the ordered polis. Alexis de Tocqueville expanded upon this notion by focusing on
the diversity of social associations which may produce the civic skills necessary for political life
within a democratic republic, but that occur apart from the state. This Tocquevillian tradition was
contemporaneously revived by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s, The Civic Culture. Advanced
during the behavioralism era of the 1960’s, Almond and Verba presented empirical evidence
correlating public support for democracy, with trust (in others and in government), and a general
willingness to participate in civic life. It was found that seemingly non-political attitudes and
affiliations underlie distinctly political behavior.
The concept of trust as a variable has been considered within the broader general context
of political culture, and within the more specific literature pertaining to civil society. The
willingness to trust others- particularly strangers- fosters civic mindedness/facilitates the building
of a civic community (Putnam 1993). Harkening back to de Tocqueville’s theory of democratic
governance, Gianfranco Poggi (1972, 59) contends that “Interpersonal trust is probably the moral
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orientation that most needs to be diffused among the people if republican society is to be
maintained.” Even actions that may be purely self-interested are affected within the context of
trust-reinforced social networks. Rather than fostering individuals acting in isolation from one
another, trust-reinforced civic communities increase the social interconnectedness of individuals,
in turn decreasing the opportunities- and inclination- to free-ride and defect from calls for
collective action (Granovetter 1985).
When it comes to fostering civic-mindedness, not all trust is the same. People’s feelings of
trust vary based upon their perception of ingroup/outgroup dynamics. Particularized trust fosters
deeper ties to a smaller social circle, i.e. the recognized ingroup to which an individual belongs.
This type of trust is what Putnam (2000) refers to as “bonding” social capital. Generalized trust
reflects an individual’s belief that most others- including those who belong to recognized
outgroups- share the same fundamental values (Fukuyama 1995). When generalized trust extends
between groups (i.e. “bridging” social capital), norms of reciprocity and cooperation are furthered.
Linking this notion of trust to ethnicity, scholars have posited that greater degrees of ethnic
heterogeneity may produce less generalized trust, and impede cooperation between members of
differing social groups (Alesina and La Ferrera 2002; Collier 2001), while ethnocentrism generally
predicts more particularized trust and promotes cooperation among in-group members (Hammond
and Axelrod 2006). Expounding upon these relationships, Bahry et al. (2005) articulate a four-fold
typology that accounts for variation in an individual’s degree of trust vis a vis their recognized
ingroup, and known outgroups:
“inclusionary” trust (reflects bridging social capital)- people who trust both their in-group, and out-groups.
“exclusionary trust (reflects bonding social capital)- people who trust their own in-group, but distrust outgroups.
“alienated” trust- people who distrust their own in-group, but trust out-groups.
“atomized” trust- individuals who trust neither their in-group, nor out-groups.
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What all of these views have in common, is a tacit assumption that the ingroup/outgroup is clearly
defined in the minds of individuals, i.e. there exists a clearly defined sense of who “we” are, and
who “they” are. This in turn facilitates uncertainty reduction which social psychologists have
increasingly confirmed serves as a fundamental human motivation driving the near universal
tendency for humans to conceptually categorize themselves into groups (Hale 2004).
But what if this is not the case? Before one can speak of an individual’s trust ‘within’ or
‘between’ groups, there must exist a coherent sense of the “us” and “them”. In other words,
“Identity of territory and citizenry must be clearly enough defined to allow behavior to be
predictable, interests to be complementary, and mutual trust to grow…” (Rustow 1967, 36)
Without a coherent a priori sense of national identity, it may be difficult- if not outright
impossible- to create and foster the spirit of “social connectedness” that facilitates cooperation and
coordination for the common good.

1.3

National Identity and Democratization
What is national identity in its basic form? Smith (1991, 75) characterizes national identity

as a “sameness” in “national character” and identifies it as a goal arising out of the process of
nationalism. Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” highlights the socially
constructed nature of such character. Thus, national identity can be briefly summarized as a
socially constructed sameness resulting from the process of nationalism (Kunovich 2009).
Returning to the broader theoretical question of what influences democratization, if
national identity matters for democratization, then why (and how) does it matter? Assuming for a
moment that national identity does foster democracy, (albeit in an indirect fashion as opposed to a
direct transformation of institutions), how does it do so? The crucial component linking identity
and democratization is trust. When a greater cohesive sense of identity exists within a nation, bonds

8
of loyalty and trust are strengthened, and the impetus for greater cooperation exists. As John Stuart
Mill noted,
“A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves by
common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others-- which make them co-operate with
each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that is
should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively.” (1861 in Rustow 1967, 20;
underlining added)

Rustow’s (1967, 24) concurrent definition holds that “… a nation is conceived of a group of people
bound together by a common loyalty…” Thus as instruments of social communication foster
greater education, communicative understanding, and awareness amongst the population,
suspicions subside and common daily interactions occur with less suspicion and greater frequency.
In this fashion, “A modernizing society attains its growing understanding and control over the
forces of nature through the cooperation of ever wider groups and at length the entire population…
Loyalty presupposes trust; and in the modern world only a modernizing nation is likely to retain
the loyalties of its people over the long run (Rustow 1967, 30-31, emphasis added).” In turn, I
contend that trust presupposes a coherent sense of politically relevant national identification.
Any relationship between national identity and democratization must account for a linkage
between two distinct types of societal-level phenomena: institutional system properties
characterizing a nation’s political system, and the psychological mass tendencies of it population
(Welzel and Inglehart 2007, Coppedge 2012). Such an assumption has historical antecedents as
far back as Aristotle’s Politics and de Toqueville’s Democracy in America. Contemporary
scholarship- beginning with Eckstein (1966) and continuing with Welzel and Inglehart (2007)- has
framed this linkage in terms of congruence theory, arguing that a country’s patterns of political
authority must be congruent with the authority orientations of the public. This supports the belief
that “democracy…can survive and advance only when the mass public is committed to it” (Shin
1994 137).
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Previous scholarship efforts have considered the character of varying systems of mass
belief. Beginning with Adorno et al. (1950) identification of an “authoritarian personality”, and
Lasswell’s (1951) converse recognition of “democratic character”, Rokeach (1960) considers
“open” and “closed” belief systems that differ on the primary basis of belief in existential security
or existential threat. Open belief systems are more compatible with democratic alignments, while
closed belief systems are consistent with authoritarian rule (Rokeach 1973). When processes bring
about more favorable existential conditions (e.g. economic modernization), belief systems may
shift from a more closed to a more open outlook (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997).
This scholarship seeks to follow in the efforts of Welzel and Inglehart (2007) and Brudny
and Finkel (2011) in the consideration of national identity as a mass belief that influences
democratization, likely as a bridge or an intervening variable between exogenous socioeconomic
conditions and institutional democratization. A coherent, widely held sense of national identity
can relieve existential pressures and foster an open-belief system. Conversely, when the question
of identity is unresolved, such pressures may be exacerbated, trust diminished, and the resulting
belief system remains “closed”. Democratization cannot be achieved by the mere existence of
socioeconomic conditions- collective actions are required and such efforts require motivational
forces propelling them towards democracy. Mass beliefs provide such motivational forces, thus
beliefs such as national identity translate socioeconomic conditions into the collective efforts that
achieve, consolidate, and sustain democracy (Welzel and Inglehart 2007). Alternatively, in
contexts where democratic institutions are nascent, weak, or underdeveloped, the presence of
strongly-held, stable sense of national identity may mitigate or prevent democratic backsliding,
whereas weakly-held or unstable conceptions might create more permissive conditions for
democratic erosion. Even with the contemporary conceptual/terminological framing of transition
and consolidation, national identity has a place within the story of democratization. While Rustow
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has been mostly forgotten, I believe that his original identification of a potential relationship
between national identity and democracy is deserving of further exploration within this context.

1.4

What Comes Next
Is there evidence to support the existence of the theoretical relationship between an

intersubjectively-held conception of national identity and attitudes regarding democratic
consolidation? This first chapter identified Dwankart Rustow’s original hypothesis- as well as a
sampling of subsequent scholarly efforts- relating national identity to democratization, and broadly
relates the consideration of the question to other approaches that seek to explain the emergence
and survival of democracy. The second chapter presents the literature review, delving deeper intoand situating this question within- the broader literature pertaining to both national identity and
democratization, with an eye towards reconciling this research effort with existing scholarship
specifically pertaining to post-Soviet Russia within each of these two broad realms.
The three chapters that follow reflect the operationalization, research, and analysis of the
central question. These analytical chapters will be organized around the progression of the
identified research objectives. Chapter 3 explores trends in public attitudes regarding various forms
of group identity over time. Chapter 4 focuses on the development of the measurement component
for national identity. Chapter 5 then tests the central research hypotheses under examination. These
analytical chapters are then followed by a concluding chapter which summarizes the findings and
outlines considerations for future research.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Before delving into the treatment of whether an empirically verifiable relationship exists
between respondents’ attitudes towards national identity and attitudes towards democracy, it is
important to first understand the foundational underpinnings of what national identity is as well as
its political significance. The philosophical origins of national identity can be traced back to the
political philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau. In contrast to John Locke’s emphasis on the stateprotected rights and freedoms of the individual, Rousseau stressed the importance of the collective
rights and freedoms of the community representing the general will of “the people” as a collective
entity (Sodaro 2004). In the 19th century, John Stuart Mill continued in this vein when considering
the importance of collective national affiliation for the development of democratic governance.
Contemporary scholars of liberal nationalism have not only emphasized the continuing reality of
national identity, but also have sought to permanently integrate its role within discussions of
philosophical liberalism (Dzur 2002).

2.1

Understanding ‘National Identity’
What ‘is’ national identity? At its most fundamental level national identity reflects a

nation’s relationship to “the other” resulting from the contact and inter-relationship between (at
least) two groups (Prizel 1998). The foundations of a nation arise when people believe that they
can communicate more easily with some than with others. They then begin to define who is within
the group and who the “others” are (Suny 1993). This formative distinction reflects a shared
consciousness that serves as a basis for collective interests, and subsequent collective action.
Of central importance to this shared sense of consciousness is a similarly shared basis of
communication. Karl Deutsch (1953) conceptualizes the making of a nation as a process of
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increasing communication among the members of a collective group or ‘people’. Corresponding
processes such as modernization and urbanization increase the degree of social interaction within
a group, resulting in enhanced political awareness and a subsequent progression from ‘a people’
to a ‘nationality’ and in some cases a ‘nation-state.’ In a distinct yet somewhat related vein
Benedict Anderson (1991) points to the advent of print-capitalism as the causal force behind the
rise of national consciousness. The rise of print publishing and its subsequent uses in state
administration required the standardization of a shared vernacular for people within a state. Printcapitalism required a reduction in the number of spoken dialects and a resulting abbreviation of
print languages that were fewer in number and capable of being understood by a wider audience.
At the heart of nationality discussions lies a disputation regarding the origins of the
collective community (i.e. nation) in question. Is there some objective pre-existing basis linking a
grouping of people together, or is any basis of shared identification largely subjective and socially
constructed? Anthony Smith (1991) identifies a pre-existing cultural basis that distinguishes
between human societies (i.e. ‘ethnies’) along ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious lines. These
communities share such fundamental features as common myths of descent, a sense of history,
language and/or religion, and often a historic association with a territory or homeland. Others have
disagreed with this assessment. The disagreement lies not with the substantive basis of such
associations, but rather that the processual component of arriving at such associations is socially
constructed rather than objectively inherent or pre-existing. In addition to the aforementioned
social and economic forces, individuals are widely seen to be the active agents in the construction
of nations and national identity (Fearon and Laitin 2000). The shared traditions and history of
origin for a people were invented at some point in time, by someone, and for some purpose. This
parallels the process by which nations themselves are actively constructed. Such processes
typically involve academic scholars and/or political elites who actively diffuse national ideas based
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upon a hyper-accentuated linkage to cultural, historical, and linguistic markers (Gellner 1983;
Hroch 1985). This process results in Anderson’s oft-cited definition of a nation as an “imagined
political community,” subjective in its basis yet quite real in its inter-subjectively shared sense of
belief in- and belonging to- a unique community (1991, 6).
Having briefly explained both the concepts of nation and national identity, it is important
to distinguish them from the related yet distinct ideas of nationalism and the state. This also
provides insight into the issue of ‘how’ national identity is brought about. According to Anthony
Smith (1983, 21), nationalism is a doctrine that holds that 1) humanity is divided into nations, 2)
the sources of political power lies within the collectivity of the nation, 3) loyalty to one’s nation
overrides all other loyalties, and 4) that nations are only fully realized once they assume control of
(and become synonymous with) the apparati of sovereign states. Thus nationalism is “primarily a
principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Hobsbawm 1990,
9). This understanding of nationalism highlights the centrality of political interests, and the oftstated goal of achieving statehood within nationalist discourses (Suny 1993). To these stated
political ends, national identity can be thought of as the more passive basis of commonality which
provides “the cornerstone of nationalism” as an active political force and/or ideology.
Another articulation of this idea is the notion of “stateness”- the relationship between
feelings of national unity among groups of people within (and to) an existing state, and the
subsequent relationship between social membership and democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996).
National identity- insofar as its political relevance is concerned- reflects the tensions arising from
these related, yet often conflicting ideas. It is important to remember that nations may nationalize,
but it is states that democratize. Thus nationalizing discourses are not always congruous with
democratization discourses. This reflects the tension identified by Linz and Stepan between
building nations and crafting democracy (1996). Their efforts sought to answer under what
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empirical conditions is the logic of building nation-states complementary to- versus in conflict
with- the logic of democratization. They note that, “conflicts between these different policies are
reduced when almost all residents of state identify with one subjective idea of the nation, and that
nation is virtually contiguous with the state” (1996, 25). Logically agreements addressing (and
hopefully resolving) such ‘stateness’ conflicts are in place prior to the creation of democratic
institutions. Failure to do so reflects “problems of the proper scope and domain of democratic units
from within democratic theory. Like the majority principle, the democratic process presupposes a
unit. The criteria of the democratic process presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself. If the unit
itself is not [considered] proper or rightful – if its scope or domain is not justifiable- then it cannot
be made rightful simply by democratic procedures” (Dahl 1989, 207).
Not only does the state serves as a goal for most nationalist discourses, but once achieved,
becomes the mechanism by which the continuing formation of national identity is most actively
fostered (Gellner 1983, Weber 1976). Perhaps the most widely understood means is the
transmission of national values from high-culture groups to low-culture groups within a state
(Gellner 1983). This process of cultural homogenization and standardized education (brought
about by the historical necessities of industrialization and urbanization, notably the increasing need
for shared communication among incoming factory workers) reflects a top-down approach to
nation building by political elites who are in control of state resources and institutions.
2.1.1

Theoretical and Practical Significance
Why are questions of national identity important? In theoretical terms, it has been noted

that national identity lies at the heart of the most fundamental level of decision-making within any
political system. Before the fundamental political questions of ‘who gets what, when, and how’
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can be answered, there must already be a sense of the ‘who we are’ in question, that is a decision
on the identity and territorial boundaries of the political system (Offe 1997).
As a practical extension of this idea, the scope and strength of collective identity has been
associated with the onset of conflictual behavior between competing groups. Social identity theory
argues that strong feelings of collective social identity result in individuals enhancing the
perceptions of the ingroup while concurrently devaluing the outgroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
The stronger the identification with the ingroup, the greater the potential for a more negative
devaluation of the target outgroup, and thus a greater potential for conflict (Schafer 1999,
Hammond and Axelrod 2006). At the national level, this enhanced ingroup identification is best
understood when associated with ideas of patriotism, while the outward devaluation of an outgroup
is linked to the more negative derivations of nationalism (Druckman 1994).
Of course, the more relevant significance of national identity- at least for purposes of this
project- relates to its supposed relationship with democracy, specifically a country’s prospects for
democratic consolidation. This project seeks to test whether the importance of national identity
extends beyond these micro-level manifestations (e.g. inter-personal and/or small-group conflict)
in an effort to determine whether an inter-subjectively held mass belief among the population of a
country has any bearing upon that country’s prospects for achieving or sustaining democratization
(Almond and Verba 1963, Inglehart 2003, Qi and Shin 2011). As noted in the preceding chapter,
some scholars have argued that a coherent sense of national identity is a (and perhaps the only)
necessary precondition to democratization (Rustow 1970; Linz and Stepan 1996). Whether
evidence exists to support this relationship is the fundamental question underlying this research
effort.
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2.2

Qualifying Rustow’s Theory
It is important to recognize the limitations to- and the intended scope of- Rustow’s ideas.

Dankwart Rustow’s original stated hypothesis accounts for a scenario of regime transformation
within a state from non-democracy to democracy (i.e. the transitional process of democratization).
Although not explicitly mentioned, this could be reasonably extended to a scenario whereby a
democratic regime emerges within a new state, post-independence from another state. Rustow’s
original conceptualization never argues or implies that national identity is a sufficient condition
for democratization. Also, while original conceived and presented as one component within a
theory to explain democratic transition, I’m positing that it may be more appropriate to conceive
of the workings of national identity as having its greatest impact during the consolidation phase,
rather than during the transitional phase (depending on how/where one draws the line between the
two). Finally, given that national identity is conceived as being dynamic rather than static, it does
allow for the later development of national identity-based issues even after democracy has been
consolidated (e.g. contemporary identity-issues arising in democratically mature Belgium).
These caveats are important for a couple of reasons. That the theory does not propose that
the presence of national identity unto itself is a sufficient condition for democratization, addresses
whether answering the question of “Does one find examples of states NOT becoming democratic
WITH a strong, well-defined sense of national identity?” constitutes an acceptable challenge to
the theory. With the impact of national identity articulated as a necessary condition, this implies
that other circumstances are allowable or perhaps even necessary to produce a transitional event
such as internal regime transformation. Otherwise the case of China might be used as a counter
example whereby a strong sense of national identity is present, yet the country is not democratic.
Such cases reflect how the permissiveness of existing institutional arrangements must also be
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considered-particularly in relation to the transition phase- as has been noted by Samuel Huntington
(1968).
When transformative events occur (which may themselves be facilitated by strong national
identity), a strong national identity may be better conceived as a concurrent necessary condition
for democratic consolidation. This adaptation of Rustow’s ideas within the more contemporary
framework of transition and consolidation reframes the theory, casting national identity as a
facilitating condition still in need of an exogenous transformational event. This in turn addresses
the distinction of creating a democracy versus sustaining/consolidating a democracy already
created (i.e. preventing backsliding from occurring).
Besides the possibility of countries having a strong sense of national identity without
democracy, it is also important to consider countries that achieved democracy, and then later
experienced some sort of identity crisis that threatened the stability or cohesiveness of the whole.
Are there examples of currently “mature” democratic states with unresolved national identity
issues? Certainly. Examples such as The Netherlands 1, Belgium 2, and Canada 3, readily come to

1

Netherlands basis = 1579 Treaty of Utrecht (i.e. Protestant provinces joining together against Catholic Spain).
Religious identity reflecting pre-national consciousness, which didn’t develop until late 1700’s.

2

Belgium- feelings of underrepresentation/subsequent Independence from Netherlands analogous to the U.S. 1830
Revolution predicated primarily upon religious (and also linguistic) differences (cleavages) was relatively
homogenous; Catholic unity/mostly French-speaking. Unlike Netherlands, reflects fusion of primarily religious
identification with national consciousness/considerations. More provinces (i.e. more representatives) + ruling elite all
from Northern (present-day) Netherlands. Majority of population (with fewer representatives) in the ‘South’ (i.e.
Belgium). Within this southern region, relatively homogenous; Catholic unity/mostly French-speaking. Flemish (i.e.
Dutch speaking) region of northern Belgium included by force, mainly due to economic reasons Flemish/ Dutch).
Upon independence from Protestant Netherlands, the official language of newly independent Belgium was French,
and Dutch speaking majority in the Flanders region was marginalized. A Flemish movement began and steadily grew
in importance, and the Dutch language was given official state recognition in 1898. Later, the regional-based Walloon
(with accompanying French dialect) sub-cleavage also gained prominence over time.] Initial independence predicated
upon primarily religious (secondarily linguistic) sense of national unity. Democratic institutions were developed.
Saliency of religious cleavage diminished over time (supplanted in importance by linguistic/regional cleavages).
3

Canada- 1763 France ceded Canada to British; Quebec Act of 1774 was passed to quell discontent among French
settlers who remained (it also ceded territory from the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley region, fueling American
independence; 1783 Treaty of Paris recognized independence and returned said land back to U.S.) 1867 Constitution
Act = Canada designation as a unique, confederal administrative territory; 1931 independence of a democratically
ruled territory from an equally democratic Great Britain.
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mind. But such cases do not necessarily disprove the role that national identity may have served
during the consolidation process. Arguably there was either a pre-existing, coherent basis of
national identity upon initially gaining independence, or one that developed during an identifiable
consolidation phase. National unity issues may certainly arise- or the saliency of long-existing
issues may increase- post consolidation, at which point already established democratic practices
can ameliorate the potential negative consequences of these divisions.
A more significant prima facie test of the theory is whether one finds examples of states
achieving democratic consolidation WITHOUT a strong, well-defined sense of national identity.
Baogong He (2001) offers such a test citing the examples of South Korea, Taiwan, and Russia. If
true, He’s argument regarding these cases would be problematic for Rustow’s theory, and thus
need to be addressed. However, He’s analysis seemingly conflates issues of territorial unification
(involving North and South Korea, and China and Taiwan) with national identity, asserting that
such issues are reflective of a lack of national identity in both South Korea and Taiwan respectively.
However, I would contend that each of these cases does possess its own unique and coherent sense
of identity, and that the development of such distinct identities may be a significant factor
preventing unification.
In examining the historical development of both Taiwan and South Korea, there is a marked
difference in the degree of acceptance and the attitudes towards the effects and legacy of Japanese
imperialism. Korea (pre-split) already had a well-developed sense of identity, resulting a greater
rejection and hostility towards the legacy of Japanese imperialism. Conversely, pre-WWII Taiwan
did not, and even today aspects of Taiwanese society and culture reflect a positive acceptance of
Imperial Japanese influence.
These pre-War imperial remnants were the existing cultural/societal base encountered by
the Nationalists that fled from mainland China in 1949. Modern Taiwanese national identity
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reflects a fusion of this ‘Nationalist-meets-Japanese-imperial-legacy’, which is a stark contrast
with the national identity of mainland communist China. In fact, the issue of unification (vs. formal
independence, or the uneasy in-between nature of the status quo) reflects the existence- not the
absence- of a unique and coherent sense of national identity. Granted, part of China’s national
identity may include the incorporation of Taiwan, but that is not the same as Taiwan’s identity
(and related desire of independence, formal or otherwise).
The case for South Korean identity is bit different. In 1945, Japan surrendered to U.S. and
Russian forces. Ensuing Cold- War antagonism resulted in the 1948 division of North and South
Korea, analogous to the division of East and West Germany. However, the key distinction between
divided Germany and divided Korea was North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950, and an
eventual stalemate (but no formal cessation of hostilities) by 1953. South Korea made some strides
towards democracy in the 1960’s, but autocratic rule ensued until 1987. I would argue that the
post-WWII fracturing of the country initially stunted the development of a contemporary unified
Korean national identity, while a South Korean national identity was kick-started after the 1950
invasion. To this day, mandatory military service exists for all South Korean men in response to
the potential threat from North Korea. While Koreans from both North and South Korea may hold
hopes of a politically unified Korea- and the return to a potentially unified Korean national
identity- this does not undercut the current reality of distinctive national identification within each
country.
In the case of Russia, I would accept the possibility of He’s latter premise (i.e. Russia might
be lacking in a stable, generally understood and agreed upon sense of national identity) while the
fundamental basis of this research reflects the belief that Russia is not currently a consolidated
democracy. He’s assertion to the contrary is based upon a cursory glance at developments in the
early-to-mid 1990’s- it only reflects the identification of Russia’s preliminary transition- but does
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not address whether consolidation of Russia’s democracy ever occurred nor accounts for
developments of the past fifteen years.
Having addressed some of the cursory challenges to Rustow’s theory, it is important to
consider the limitations that exist regarding its applicable scope. With Rustow’s original
articulation applicable to scenarios of transition, in general there are two circumstances in which
one would expect Rustow’s theory to manifest itself: 1) a country whose borders remain (relatively)
fixed which transitions from non-democracy towards democracy, and 2) a newly independent
country that arises out of a post-colonial context, or that emerges from the dissolution of a previous
state entity.
In this latter circumstance there exists a choice between democracy and non-democracy,
albeit one influenced by the legacy of the previous regime type. When the previous system is
democratic, and strong national identity exists along with the conditions for independence, one
would expect the new system to become democratic. Confirmation of such cases result in a weak
test of the theory, i.e. one would expect to find democracy emerge given the cited conditions.
When the previous system is democratic, and national identity is weak or non-existent exists (along
with the transformative conditions for a new regime type), this provides a stronger test. If
democracy is absent in the newly emerging political system than one finds stronger support for the
theory (i.e. that national identity is necessary). If one finds the consolidation of democracy in spite
of the lack of coherent national identity, one has evidence effectively challenging, and potentially
disproving the theory. When the previous system is non-democratic, and a transformative event
occurs resulting in a newly emerging democracy, the eventual consolidation of democracy along
with the presence of a strong national identity would buttress Rustow’s theory, while its absence
would cast significant doubt. A hypothetical situation where the previous system is non-democratic,
a strong national identity exists, a transformative event occurs, but democracy does not take hold
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would suggest the need for greater evaluation and/or the absence of (an)other necessary
condition(s).

2.3

The Case of Russia
The role of elite efforts to foster a sense of shared national unity vis a vis the state is clearly

reflected in the recent history of Russia and the former Soviet Union. In reviewing these efforts, it
is worthwhile to first consider the unique character of the former Soviet Empire. Indeed, the very
use of the term ‘empire’ is subject to debate (Duncan 2005). Some have proposed that an empire
is defined by its multi-national character, where typically one dominant group enjoys a position of
privilege over other minority groups. Yet the Soviet Union presents a unique case in that the
majority of “Russians lived worse than other minorities” within its boundaries (Duncan 2005, 285).
The reason for this is the legacy of top-down Soviet-era policies that actively promoted the
national consciousness of ethnic minority groups, in a pre-emptive effort to combat the potentially
destabilizing effects of nationalism. Beginning in the 1920’s, these policies were Lenin’s answer
to the “nationality question (Slezkine 1994; Suny 1993). In the minds of the Soviet leadership there
was a conflict between “Great Russians” and “non-Great Russians”- the latter being the victims of
the former’s ethnic arrogance and “great power chauvinism” (Slezkine 1994, 209). Allowing such
conflict to persist would make it difficult to reap the fruits of the Soviet revolution, and tempt
minority groups to engage in reactionary nationalism.
The response was policies designed to simultaneously eliminate the possibility of unique
political sovereignty for minority groups within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, while
guaranteeing and promoting territorial, educational, and cultural autonomy within certain political
units, formally institutionalizing ethnicity within the state apparatus, and actively promoting native
cadres into positions of regional power within the Soviet party-state (Suny 1993). This seemingly
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contradictory policy provided concrete privileges for non-Russians and resulted in what one
scholar describes as the world’s only “Affirmative Action” Empire (Martin 2001).
But after minority nationalities were defined, recognized, and formally supported, the
question remained- what about the Russians? “Russian” was initially a politically empty categorya “non nation” within the early Soviet Union (Slezkine 1994, 218). Russians did not have their
own party, national academies, or a clearly defined territory that was truly their own. They could
be recognized as minorities in territories assigned to others, but in the Russian Soviet Republic,
they had no additional rights or opportunities of a national character (Slezkine 1994). Yet
beginning with the recognition of Russian as an ethnic group (which did not occur until the 1930’s)
‘Russian’ was perceived as increasingly synonymous with ‘Soviet’ in the eyes of non-Russians
and thus inherently privileged. One reflection of this was that linguistically, Russian effectively
became the Soviet lingua franca. To further illustrate the relationship between Russians and nonRussians, Yuri Slezkine (1994) employs an analogy of a communal apartment. Every recognized
non-Russian minority nationality had its own room. Russians on the other hand did not, but rather
occupied the central hallway and kitchen space where all major decisions affecting the apartment
as a whole were made. As time went by, the minority tenants became unequal and felt increasingly
excluded until finally closing themselves off from the central hallway for good.
It is easy to envision how such policies planted the seeds of formative nationalist
movements that were eventually sown with the onset of political liberalization in the 1980’s.
Although the history of such policies is useful for explaining the formation of national identity in
non-Russian Soviet Republics and addressing the question of “Why the USSR broke up?” it does
not provide any analytical traction for addressing what the state of Russian national identity is at
present. Indeed, much of recent post-Soviet identity scholarship has focused on the development
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of non-Russian national identity (e.g. Agadjanian 2001), leaving the particular issue of Russian
national identity in need of further exploration.
Some scholars have made some preliminary inroads addressing the effects of elite efforts
on the broader public (Tolz 2001). Based on survey data collected in the mid-1990’s, Tolz
concludes that the general sentiment of most Russians reflects support for nation-building along
voluntaristic, civically-oriented lines. Is this still the case? Has this sentiment become effectively
consolidated? Or have these observations from the mid-1990’s become outdated, and not reflective
of recent elite efforts at nation-building? This reflects the general sense that a vagueness persists
in the notion of ‘Rusianness’ (Prizel 1998) and the question still remains, who should be members
of the national community? By what definition or criterion should members be defined?
2.3.1

The post-Soviet Context as a Unique Opportunity to Evaluate Rustow’s Theory.
While much has been written about Russia and it’s supposed ‘identity crisis’ following the

collapse of the former Soviet Union (e.g. Chaffetz 1996), there have been few empirical efforts to
link this phenomenon with Russia’s struggles to democratize. While Russia is nominally a
democracy 4 insofar as it meets the minimalist standard of maintaining free and relatively fair
elections, most scholars would never confuse Russia with cases reflecting more maximalist
conceptions of democracy. Conversely there has been a relative degree of certainty regarding who
‘we the people’ are in some of these former-soviet republics that are now independent countries.
These countries broke away precisely because they felt a sense of identity among themselves that

4

According to excerpts taken from the 2010 Polity IV Country report, “While far from consolidated, nevertheless,
democratic norms and institutions in Russia have been bolstered by the electoral contests of the past decade. In contrast
to the political climate of the early 1990s, all major political players now openly voice their belief that elections are
the only legitimate means for assuming power. However, Russia’s effort to consolidate democracy continues to face
serious challenges. While the most recent elections were not marred by significant political violence or voter fraud,
the Kremlin continued to use its institutional powers to interfere with the electoral process. Most significantly, the
government effectively restricted media freedom.”
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was incongruent with the larger Soviet Union. In some cases, the transition away from Soviet-era
political and economic practices occurred with relative ease and little hardship. Bridging these two
bodies of scholarship, this effort considers whether the lack of democratic consolidation reflects
the lack of a coherent- or at least stable- sense of national identity. While other scholars have
advanced similar arguments much of the evidentiary support for the argument has been theoretical
rather than empirical. For example, one of the most forceful articulations of this argument to date
(Brudny and Finkel 2011, 825), provides four paragraphs- two each for Russian and Ukrainecomparing descriptive statistics derived from public opinion polls from each country in support of
their central argument. While I find the central argument itself to be persuasive, the evidentiary
support is admittedly lacking, thus the efforts that follow.
Within the general context of the former Soviet Union, the previous system was nondemocratic, and multiple political systems emerged with some becoming more democratic and
others becoming less democratic. In this situation, the previous regime type is effectively held
constant, and its impact as a variable is controlled. This post-Soviet context is also roughly the
equivalent of post-colonial independence, i.e. in both situations there is a fresh start for the newly
independent countries. Within this context there exists a great deal of observable variation. Many
countries emerged with new freedoms and institutional arrangements. Some countries have since
experienced backsliding, while others seem to be moving slowly towards democratic consolidation.
Given both the relative variation in the strength and coherence of national identification as well as
the variation in regime-type outcomes, this post-Soviet context provides the ideal circumstances
to robustly test Rustow’s theory. Thus the break-up of the former Soviet Union provides a unique
opportunity to compare and contrast how variation in national identity (as a cause) may have
affected the process of democratization, resulting in variation within public attitudes towards
democracy (as a consequence). While this project is limited to an initial empirical analysis of
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Russia, if the findings do not result in an outright rejection of Rustow’s theory, then there will be
a ready supply of logically subsequent cases to continue testing which in turn should aid in
developing, deepening, or disproving said theory.

2.4

Methodology
Ultimately the following efforts to measure and assess the development of this potential

relationship between national identity and democratization will treat national identity as an ordinal
variable that changes over time rather than as a static nominal variable. Such an effort is analogous
to the debate within democratization literature arguing whether consideration of democracy as a
dependent variable ought to be treated in a nominal vs. ordinal fashion (e.g. Sartori 1987, Bollen
1990, Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Such efforts will be predicated upon survey data reflective
of public national consciousness within the selected countries. In analyzing this data, I will look
to construct a big-picture image of what (if any) consensus exists as to what national identity ‘is’
within the context of Russia, whether this construct has changed over time, and how this variation
relates to indicators of measures of public attitudes regarding democracy. This analysis evaluates
the evolution of Russia’s national identity- and its subsequent attitudes towards democracy- as a
country ‘left behind’ amidst the historical, cultural, and institutional remnants of the past.
Assuming evidence of such a relationship is discovered the completion of such an analysis serves
as a foundation for future comparative efforts, providing a basis by which to contrast the
development of national identity in these ‘break-away’ countries.
2.4.1

Use of Identity as a Variable
To better study the effects of social identity, it is useful to consider the literature that seeks

to clarify and guide operationalization efforts of the term identity for use as a variable. Identity
refers to a social category, or a set of people that have been ascribed a particular label- for example,
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‘Russian’ in the examination to follow (Fearon and Laitin 2000). According to Fearon and Laitin
(2000), these categories are distinguished by two main features: rules of membership that
determine who is (and who is not) a member of the categorical group; and content, that reflects the
characteristics thought to be representative of members within the categorical boundary.
The elaboration and development of a somewhat similar analytical framework was the
recent subject of focus for Abdelal et al. (2006). For them, identity as a social category is
recognized as varying long two key dimensions; content and contestation. The basic understanding
of content as describing the meaning and collective identity is similar to that of Fearon and Laitin
(2000). However, Abdelal et al. (2006) further break down and specify the composition of content
as reflecting any potential combination of four elements: constitutive norms (including the rules
that define membership), relational comparisons, social purposes, and cognitive models.
Contestation refers simply to the degree of agreement within in a group over said content.
Similarly, Schafer (1999) identifies three dimensions of group-based identity. Again, the
first is content, or the belief in the shared basis of similarity. Second is the instrumental dimension,
or the extent of an individual’s motivation to support one’s country (i.e. patriotism). Third concerns
the nature of the outgroup as indicated by perceptual comparisons of the group member to the
identified ‘other.’ This corresponds with Abdelal et al. (2006) ‘relational comparisons’ content
sub-type but is articulated as a necessarily unique dimension of group-based identity.
The variation that exists along the content dimension shared by all three perspectives has
been the primary focus of scholarly efforts to define and explain the substance of identity. In the
general scholarship on national identity, the two primary content dimensions that have been most
often identified are an ethnic-orientation and a civic-orientation (Chafetz 1996). These dimensions
are generally applicable to the case of Russia, although some authors have identified and expanded
this range to as many as five differing conceptions of potentially valid content orientations. In
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addition to the two primary orientations, Tolz (2000) considers a linguistic orientation (often
collapsed into other ethnic orientations, but purposefully separated by Tolz), a racial orientation
(easily the least resonant of the five), and a union identity. This last one is perhaps the most
intriguing supplement to the standard dichotomous ethnic/civic pairing, emphasizing the multiethnic character and common history of the former Soviet Union. Related to this conception is
Hopf’s identification of five specific sources of pride in the Soviet experience- its status as a global
power, the emergence of democracy under Soviet rule, the quality of Soviet mass culture, the
conditions for young people, and Soviet economic performance (2002, 160). Considering these
competing content dimensions, the primary focus of chapter four will be attempting to cast light
on which dimensional basis is supported by the available data.
2.4.2

Inventory of Available Data
A number of potentially fruitful survey data sources exist and are available at Gesis.org.

These include a variety of collections within various International Survey Programs (e.g. ISSP,
and European Values Survey). Within the ISSP series, modules from 1995, 2003, and 2013 focus
on the topic of national identity and provide a good amount of material allowing for the
development of potential identity constructs. The drawback of the ISSP datasets is that they only
include one question measuring the degree of pride in the way democracy works. The European
Values Survey- a longitudinal study completed in four waves between 1981 and 2008- captured
similar attitudes within the pool of potential county cases in the 1990, 1999, and 2008 panels.
Measures included the degree of satisfaction with democracy, the extent of a feeling of belonging
with different geographical groups, pride in citizenship, trust towards in-group members, and
attitudes towards immigrants. Ideally, similar findings across multiple datasets will help to
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overcome the limitations of any one dataset and enhance the robustness of the findings pertaining
to the identified research question.
2.4.3

Central Research Question and Hypotheses
Setting aside the overly deterministic language of Rustow’s original articulation, this effort

seeks to test a modified version of Rustow’s theory regarding the relationship between national
identity and democracy in the context of post-Soviet states. Such an effort is inspired by
Coppedge’s useful reminder that given the complexity of the social world which we inhabit, “any
student of comparative politics must learn to be comfortable with theories that are probabilistic,
partial, conditional, and provisional”, or in other words, measured uncertainty (2012, 5). To this
end, this effort seeks to contribute to the broad consideration of ‘why’- and ‘why not’- democracy
by addressing the following research question: Is there an identifiable relationship between
intersubjectively held conceptions of national identity and democratization?

National Identity

Democratization

(‘Mass Beliefs’)

Recalling the major camps that explain ‘why democracy?’ identified in chapter 1, within
the political cultural tradition is the idea that a strong civil-society- one that develops apart from
the state- will be reflective of/foster trust among individuals/groups and result in an increased
willingness to participate in civic life. However subsequent research has suggested that not all trust
is the same. Given the presence of differing subgroups within a society, an individual may
recognize an ‘ingroup’ as distinct from ‘outgroups’. Such recognition may result in variations in
the fostering of trust among these subgroups. When such distinctions are made, ‘trust’ that bridges
individuals identified ‘ingroup’ and its ‘outgroup’ counterpart, is essential to democratic
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consolidation. This scenario reflects that distinctive ‘ingroups/outgroups’ are present, and that an
individual possesses reasonable certainty as to the membership within these subgroups. However,
if membership boundaries are uncertain, and there is not a widely agreed upon sense as to who the
ingroup ‘is’ and who the contrasting outgroup may be, then an individual may not be able to
develop the trust necessary to foster bridging social capital.
This brings us back to the idea of national identity. If significant variation exists as to the
very nature of the national character, then trust is unable to develop resulting in the diminished
potential for democratic consolidation. Thus, it becomes essential to identify the basis by which
ingroups and outgroups are constructed, and what the relationship between such constructions may
have with a constituent’s conception of democracy. I contend that it is appropriate to ground the
consideration of national identity’s potential relationship to democratization within the subset of
research that broadly considers the relationship between “mass beliefs” as a way of understanding
a society’s potential for democratic consolidation. Granted, such an approach does not serve as a
direct explanatory basis for explaining democratic or non-democratic regime-type outcomes at the
state level. Rather findings derived from this research suggest indirect influences (e.g. permissive
socio-cultural conditions) on a country’s prospects for democratization via Congruence Theory.
While it’s worth acknowledging at the outset that many factors induce both direct and
indirect effects that influence democratization (i.e. modernization, economic development,
institutional development, civil society, etc.), and that many of these factors likely act as
exogenous variables that also influence such ‘mass beliefs’ as national identity and trust, this
complex reality suggests that alternative approaches to explaining democratization should be
viewed as complementary rather than competitive, which in turn can facilitate a more holistic
approach to explaining democratization.
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This research will proceed with testing whether an empirically verifiable relationship exists
between respondents’ attitudes towards national identity and attitudes towards democracy. This
effort will employ multiple large-N datasets capturing the attitudes of individual respondents
within Russia over multiple points (or snapshots) in time. While employing confirmatory factor
analysis and multi-level modeling techniques to capture the relationship of aggregated societal
attitudes within countries follows those made previously by Jones and Smith (2001) and Kunovich
(2009), this effort considers multiple datasets from two different survey programs (i.e. ISSP and
EVS) better allowing for an analysis of the variation in both the development of national identity
and attitudes towards democracy across time. Such an effort joins a recent surge in quantitatively
oriented scholarship that strives to improve techniques for- while advancing our understanding ofintersubjectively held schemas (such as national identity) and their potential for political
consequences (Bonikowski 2016, Aleman and Woods 2016).
There will be three major components of the ‘within case’ analyses of Russia that follows.
Chapter 3 will consider a series of summary statistics from multiple primary and secondary sources
exploring the features of relative saliency of membership within- and attitudes towards- subgroups
within Russia. This chapter will strive to distinguish national identity from other salient forms of
group identification. Utilizing survey data and employing factor analytic techniques, Chapter 4
will strive to answer whether a widely agreed upon sense of a distinctly Russian ‘ingroup’ exists
and to what extent that sense of identity has changed over time. Following this treatment of
national identity as the dependent variable, the third part of this analysis presented in Chapter 5
will deploy the developed construct as the primary independent variable, testing whether there is
evidence to suggest the existence of a potential relationship between national identity and attitudes
towards democratization via structural equation modeling (SEM). Specifically, the hypotheses to
be tested include-
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Chapter 3
H0: Distinctive trends in collective national consciousness are not identifiable.
H1: Distinctive trends in collective national consciousness are identifiable.
Chapter 4
H0: A shared sense of collective national identity is not present.
H1: A shared sense of collective national identity is present.
H0: Any shared sense of collective national identity does not change over time.
H1: Any shared sense of collective national identity does change over time.
Chapter 5
H0: There is no relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy.
H1: There is a relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy.
H0: A relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy does not change
over time.
H1: A relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy does change over
time.
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THE SALIENCE OF GROUP IDENTIFICATIONS

Does a coherent, identifiable, inter-subjectively held sense of national identification exist
within the minds of Russians? Answering this question is a necessary precursor to considering
whether- and/or to what extent- national identity may influence a country’s prospects for
democratic consolidation. To answer this question, it is useful to first identify the general contours
of the identifiable group associations which are of the greatest importance to an average Russian.
While Brudny and Finkel (2011) contend that a distinctive sense of national identity exists in both
Russia and Ukraine, their argument tacitly assumes the existence of such group identity while then
presenting limited evidence that supports this claim. This chapter treats the existence of national
identity as an empirical question rather than an assumed theoretical construct. Paralleling the
methodological approach of analyzing descriptive summary statistics employed by Brudny and
Finkel (2011), this chapter attempts a more robust analysis of this precursor question: is it possible
to empirically identify distinctive trends in collective national consciousness that in turn suggest a
shared sense of collective national identity?
In addressing this research question, this chapter tests the following hypothesis:
H0: Distinctive trends in collective national consciousness are not identifiable.
H1: Distinctive trends in collective national consciousness are identifiable.

To address this question, this initial exploration into the attitudes of Russian respondents
relating to the perceived contours of salient group identification will proceed in four parts. The
first part explores the different types of groups that Russians self-identify as belonging to, with
comparisons between findings reported via secondary data sources and preliminary statistics
generated from the datasets used throughout this research effort. The second part considers the
relative strength of pride deriving from said associations. Part three examines descriptive statistics
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relating to more explicit measures of what respondents believe is important for membership within
the Russian ‘ingroup’, followed by similar considerations as to the salient features and relevant
perceptions of various ‘outgroups’ within Russia in part four.

3.1

Identification of Salient Group Memberships
In 2013, a poll commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club in preparation for a forum on

national identity revealed that the most significant associations felt by Russians were with fellow
citizens of the Russian Federation (57%) and with residents of the same city/town (35%, Figure
1). These poll results suggest that the relative prevalence of associations with these two groups
were more than twice that of the next most significant group (i.e. generation and ethnicity, both at
16% respectively). This statistic is somewhat surprising given the aforementioned scholarly

Which group or groups do you feel like you belong to?

% of respondents, maximum three responses
Citizens of the Russian Federation
Residents of same city/town
35
Same generation
16
Same ethnic group
16
Residents of same region/territory
15
Same sex
14
Same income group
11
Same family role (e.g. mothers, grandparents, etc)
11
Same religion
10
Same social group (e.g. workers, intellectuals, etc.)
9
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8
Same subculture (e.g. classical music lovers,…
4
Same political affiliation
2
Other
1
None of the above
7
Don't know
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Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VT︠s︡IOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity:
Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013.
Figure 1: Prompted Self Idenitifcation
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contributions suggesting the absence of any cohesive sense of identification widely shared among
Russian citizens. Yet further evidence provides additional support for this arguable trend.
In 2004, a poll conducted by the Russian Institute of Sociology found that 78% of all poll
respondents claimed to identify themselves with citizens of Russia (Figure 2). By comparison
people felt a greater sense of identification with people of their same town or village (82%), people
of the same nationality (89%), people with the same life views (92%), and people of the same
profession (99%) suggested by the poll to be the most relevant basis of identification. However, a
follow-up poll conducted in 2011 reveals identification with citizens of Russia had increased to
95%, going from the least relevant to the most relevant form of self-identification.

Citizens of Russia
Ppl with same life views
2004

Ppl of same profession

2011
Ppl of same nationality
Ppl of this town/village
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120

Source: Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, IS RAS)
Figure 2: Change in the relative importance of national group identities, 2004-2011, %

This basis of identification had the most significant increase over this period of time. The
only other basis of self-identification that increased was locality (i.e. identification with people of
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the same town/village) from 82% in 2004 to 89% in 2011. Other forms of identification either
decreased (e.g. identification with people of the same life views; people of the same profession)
or stayed the same (i.e. people of the same nationality). It is interesting to note the earlier
differentiation made by respondents between their perceived sense of citizenship and nationality
(78% vs. 89% respectively in 2004) which seems to have dissipated over time (95% vs. 90% in
2011).
These findings were compared to those captured by polling data from 1992 (Figure 3).
Whereas identifying with people of the same profession was the greatest relative form of selfidentification in 2004 (99%) it was the least relevant form of self-identification in 1992 (40%).
Conversely, immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union respondents initially felt the
greatest relative connection to fellow citizens (72%), at a rate seemingly constant for the first 10+
years through 2004 (78%), before this sense of identification blossomed over the next. decade (95%
in 2011). One interesting distinction worth noting with the Institute of Sociology poll is the

Russian citizens
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Ppl with same views on life
Ppl of same nationality
Ppl of same faith
Ppl of same profession
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Source: Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, IS RAS)
Figure 3: 1992- Who do you feel a connection to a large extent, %

80
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response option of ‘fellow countryman’ distinct from both citizens of Russian and people of the
same nationality- a feature that (thankfully) was not present in subsequent polls (likely) due to the
difficulty to effectively distinguish the meaning of different responses.
Lest one conclude that the strong sense of identification with profession was some sort of
outlier, other evidence supports this sense of connection to one’s profession during this time period.
The 2003 ISSP survey provided a list and asked respondent’s which groups in said list were the
most important (and second/third most) in describing who they were. While family was the group
overwhelming chosen by most people as either the most or second most important group to
describe who they were (a feature similarly noted by the Institute of Sociology poll), occupation
was easily the second most selected of the options (Figure 4).
While this sense of identification with one’s profession was consistent across multiple polls,
there was an interesting discrepancy between one’s reported sense of identification with nationality.
In the 2004 and 2011 Institute of Sociology polls, people’s self-reported identification with
nationality was both fairly high and fairly stable over time. However, the 2003 ISSP data suggests
that- as compared to other identification options- a respondent’s connection to nationality was
relatively less important. It is worth noting that the ISSP survey featured a corresponding ‘ethnicity’
option not featured in the Institute of Sociology polls, and that the combined ISSP results for
ethnicity and nationality would correspond roughly with those reporting a connection to people of
the same nationality revealed by the Institute of Sociology data. Conversely, the Institute of
Sociology polls featured options for both nationality and citizenship, whereas the ISSP survey did
not offer a separate, explicit option for identifying with fellow citizens. Given the relative strength
of ethnic identification within the ISSP results (behind only profession and family) its categorical
omission from the Institute of Sociology polls is somewhat surprising, while the ISSP survey’s
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omission of citizens as a potential group one identifies with suggests a similar comparable
shortcoming with the survey instrument.

Occupation
Ethnic background
Gender
Age group
Most Imp

Religion

Second

Pref Pol party

Third

Nationality
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Part of Country
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Source: ISSP 2003, responses to Q1) We are all part of different groups. Some are moreimportant
to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most
important to you in describing who you are? And the second most important? And the third most
important?
Figure 4: Prompted self-identification

Having acknowledged the potential shortcomings of the ISSP survey, the results were
aggregated in a fashion similar to those of the Valdai Club polls to better facilitate a comparison
of the results (Figure 5). The revealed differences were stark. While the 2013 Valdai Club survey
suggests that the greatest sense of self-identification is with fellow citizens (57%), the 2003 ISSP
results suggest that family (57.6%) and occupation (54.1%) were the strongest bases of association.
While the identification with family is not surprising and can seemingly be explained by the
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difference in question wording (i.e. relating to your role within a family more generally, e.g. being
a grandparent in a more abstract sense vs. the more general feeling of belonging to your family),
the difference in the importance of one’s profession is less easily explained. The ISSP results
suggest 54.1% of respondent’s identifying with one’s profession from a list of available presented
choices- one of the strongest relative associations, vs. only 8% (and one of the weakest relative
associations) suggested by the Valdai results. The contrast is even starker given the approximate
similarity in findings relating to associations with ethnicity, part of country, and generation/age
group, which similarly appear as the number 3-5 options across both surveys.
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Source: ISSP 2003, responses to Q1) We are all part of different groups. Some are more important
to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most
important to you in describing who you are? And the second most important? And the third most
important?
Figure 5: Prompted self-identification, aggregate % (ordered)
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Table 1: Relative importance of prompted self-identification, comparing aggregated responses
from different sources over time.

Item

Inst. Soc ISSP Inst. Soc Inst. Soc. Valdai
1992
2003
2004
2011
2013
Citizenship
72%
N/A
78%
95%
57%
1st
4th
1st
1st
Locality
N/A
30.5%
82%
89%
35%
3rd
3rd
3rd
2nd
Profession
40%
54.1%
99%
81%
8%
4th
1st
1st
4th
4th
Nationality
51%
14.7%
89%
90%
N/A
3rd
4th
2nd
2nd
Ethnicity
N/A
31.5%
N/A
N/A
16%
2nd
3rd
(‘countrymen’)
60%
2nd

Table 1 features a comparison of the results for five selected group types, from four
different points in time. Given the omission of at least one of each of these groups from each
survey (only profession was included in all five) it was useful to evaluate the relative strength of
these group associations across the range of compiled data. Citizenship ranks high initially,
declines in relative importance, before rebounding and again registering as the group eliciting the
greatest degree of shared identification. This trend was precisely the opposite for profession which
was initially one of the weakest forms of group identification, before registering as the strongest
relative basis by two different surveys in the mid-2000’s, before again declining in relative
importance. Values representing the strength of identification on the basis of nationality were all
over the place depending on the survey instrument making even these highly generalized
comparisons difficult. However the glass-half-full perspective on this non-finding is that this lack
of a clear take-away on the basis of nationality justifies further exploration and is precisely what
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this project is all about. Interestingly ethnicity was only included in two of the data sets also
preventing meaningful comparison.
One additional feature worth noting is the slight difference in question wording between
the ISSP and Valdai Club surveys. The Valdai Club survey phrased the question as “which groups
do you feel like you belong to” while the ISSP survey asked respondents “which groups are
important to you in describing who you are”. While the distinction is subtle and perhaps only
obvious when directly comparing the survey questionnaires, it is not difficult to imagine
respondents feeling like they are part of many groups, while not necessarily feeling that all groups
they are a part of are important for describing who they are.
The multitude of available data sources also provides an interesting basis of comparison
along the lines of geography as a specific subset of belonging. Similar questions were asked in
both the 1999 and 2008 versions of the European Values Surveys (Figure 6), as well as the 1995,
2003, and 2013 ISSP surveys. Both sets of surveys suggest that the greatest relative geographic
associations are with one’s city/town and with one’s country as compared to intermediate regions
such as counties and their equivalent, or macro-aggregate considerations such as the continent writ
large. The ISSP data (Figure 7) seems to suggest that there was an initial surge in feelings of
belonging (41.7%) to one’s country shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which then
steadily declined in later years. While the ISSP results suggest that this sense of connection was
short-lived (declining in each of the subsequent surveys), the European Values Survey results
suggest the opposite trend, with only 25.2% of respondent’s initially identifying with their country
in 1999 (vs. 50.6% identifying with their town/locality), before growing to 41.6% in 2008 (while
identification with town/locality shrinks to 38.4%).
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Source: EVS data, responses to question: Which of the following geographic groups do you
belong to first of all?

Figure 6: Prompted self-identification, geographic groups.
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Source: ISSP data, responses of “Very close” to question: How close do you feel to [town/city;
county; country; continent]?
Figure 7: Strength of identification with geographic groups.
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A comparison across datasets on this basis of geography (Table 2) reveals two interesting
features. While the absolute values of the numbers for locality differ significantly between the two
datasets, both sets of surveys suggest that the relative importance of locality is slowly declining
over time. In contrast, though similar values for association with country were found in both the
EVS and ISSP data, there does not seem to be a consistent pattern over time. In fact, if one were
to examine only the ISSP data, one would reasonably conclude that the association with country
is declining over time. If one were to examine only the EVS data, the opposite conclusion would
likely be reached.
Table 2: Relative importance of geography, comparing aggregated responses from different
sources over time.

Item

ISSP
EVS
ISSP
EVS
ISSP
1995 1999 2003 2008 2013
Locality
31.8% 50.6% 29.2% 38.4% 26.1%
2nd
1st
1st
2nd
1st
County
24.6
7.9
16.5
13.4
21
3rd
3rd
3rd
3rd
3rd
Country
41.7% 25.2% 26.4% 41.6% 24.3%
1st
2nd
2nd
1st
2nd
Continent
7.8
0.4
3.3
1.3
2
4th
4th
4th
4th
4th

3.2

Pride Associated with Ingroup Membership
Shifting attention slightly from general feelings of belonging to the relative strength of

pride deriving from said feelings, we turn again to the reported results of the Valdai Club’s
commissioned poll (Figure 8). Again citizenship- and the pride associated with it- tops the list with
63% of respondent’s not only taking pride in the sense of membership with the group, but also
feeling like fellow members of this group are better than others. Two different geographic
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associations also place within the top-5 as respondents closely identify as belonging – and taking
pride in- the sense of connection with fellow residents of their city/town as well as the larger
territorial region within the country (at 58% and 53% respectively). While this strong sense of
connection with one’s local community (i.e. city/town) is consistent with the EVS and ISSP data,
this regional sense of pride and belonging being on par with one’s sense of belonging with their
more localized community is unique to the Valdai survey results.

I am proud to belong to a group, and I feel that members of this group are better than others
I consider myself a part of this group but I am not proud
I do not feel I belong to any group
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Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VT︠s︡IOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity:
Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013.
Responses to: Are you proud to belong to the following groups?
Figure 8: Identification with- and relative degree of pride in- various ingroups
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This data also suggests ethnicity as a salient basis of membership, second only to
citizenship with 59% of respondents indicating not only a sense of pride and group belonging, but
also feeling that fellow members are better than members of other ethnic groups. This finding is
consistent with the ethnic/civic dichotomy featured in much of the scholarship of the 1990’s, but
seemingly at odds with more recent scholarship which has suggested it to be a less-than-accurate
framing of contemporary Russian identity. Whereas this statistic suggests a relatively strong sense
of belonging to one’s ethnicity, different questions from the same poll produced dissimilar results.
When provided options from a list and prompted to answer ‘which group or groups do you feel
like you belong to?’ (Figure 1) only 16% of respondents selected ethnic group as one of their (up
to) three choices (versus 35% selecting residents of their city/town and 57% identifying with
citizens of the Russian Federation). And while the sense of pride and belonging to one’s city/town
is consistent with the findings described above, the relative strength of association with residents
of one’s broader region within the country is surprising given the EVS results (Figure 6) though
this latter difference may be explained in part by the slightly different emphasis on the people
within a region versus the feeling of connection to the region itself.
The strength/feeling of pride with fellow citizens (as of 2013) seems to be additionally
supported by the EVS query of ‘how proud are you to be a Russian citizen’ (Figure 9). The
percentage of respondent’s identifying themselves as very proud grew from 31.6% in 1999 to 48.5%
in 2008. Those expressing that they were somewhat proud also grew modestly (38.6% to 43%)
during this time. Conversely those expressing that they were not very proud or not proud at all
declined from a combined 29.5% in 1999 to a comparatively meager 8.5% in 2008.
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Source: EVS data, responses to question: How proud are you to be a Russian citizen?
Figure 9: Extent of pride in citizenship.
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Figure 10: Relative strength of pride in Russian citizenship vs other citizenship.
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Those agreeing with the more pointedly phrased ISSP question ‘I would rather be a citizen
of Russia than of any other country’ (Figure 10) held constant from 1995 until 2013, with the
combined percentage of those agreeing strongly or simply agreeing fluctuating slightly from 75.2%
(1995), to 77.9% (2003), to 75.1% (2013). More similarly phrased ISSP questions suggest that this
increased sense of pride not present in 1999 was manifesting itself by 2003- and holding relatively
strong/constant as of 2013- with the combined percentage of respondents identifying as very proud
or somewhat proud at 85.4% and 81.2% in 2003 and 2013 respectively (Figure 11).
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Source: ISSP data, responses to question: How proud are of being Russian?
Figure 11: Extent of pride in nationality.
Perhaps the starkest reflection/indication of this shift was captured by the responses to the
statement I am often less proud of Russia than I would like to be’ (Figure 12). In 2003, the
combined percentage of respondents who agreed/agreed strongly was 80.5%, with 12.2% neither
agreeing nor disagreeing. Only 7.4% disagreed with this sentiment. By 2013 only 65.3% of
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respondent’s agreed with this statement, with the percentage of respondent’s disagreeing rising to
13.5% and the percentage of those expressing indifference growing to 21.3%. These gains were
fueled mostly by the significant drop-off in respondents agreeing strongly with the statement- 41.8%
in 2003 dropping more than twenty percentage points to 20.7% in 2013.
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Source: ISSP data, responses to prompt: I am often less proud of Russia than I would like to be.
Figure 12: Changes in relative pride in Russian nationality vs unspecified alternative over time.

3.3

Impressions of Russianness
Having considered some indicators reflecting the relative strength/saliency of pride in

citizenship over time as one aspect of national identity, let’s now consider more explicit measures
of respondent’s perceptions of what’s important for national identity. Returning to the Valdai Club
data, the question was asked ‘who would you describe as Russian?’ (Figure 13). 35% of
respondents indicated that growing up in Russia and being raised in Russia’s cultural traditions
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best captures what it means to be Russian. This was easily the most provided answer- greater than
the next two choices combined (i.e. being ethnic Russian and being a native Russian speaker at
16% and 14% respectively). Only 10% felt that self-identification alone (i.e. someone believing
themselves to be Russian) was a sufficient criterion for describing someone as Russian.
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Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VT︠s︡IOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity:
Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013.
Response to: Who would you describe as Russian?
Figure 13: Basis for determining Russian nationality.

The inversely related question of whether ‘it is possible for people who do not share
Russia’s customs/traditions to become fully Russian’ was asked across all three of the ISSP
Surveys (Figure 14). While the combined percentage of those disagreeing was 29.4% in 1995, this
fell to 5.7% in 2003, (and held nearly constant at 5.8% in 2013). These loses fueled the gains of
those agreeing strongly, which rose from 33% in 1995 to 53.3% in 2003, while the combined
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percentage of those agreeing (i.e. agree + agree strongly) went from 59.2% in 1995 to 86.8% and
81.4% in 2003 and 2013 respectively. The responses to this question in a vacuum support the
relative assessment captured by the Valdai Club’s efforts.
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Source: ISSP data, responses to prompt: It is impossible for ppl who do not share Russia’s customs
and traditions to become fully Russian.
Figure 14: Relative importance of embracing culture as basis for nationality.

The most interesting source of data indicating what is important for Russian national
identity drives from the questions asked across multiple ISP surveys. In 1995, 2003, and 2013,
respondents were asked the relative importance of seven different attributes (and an eighth which
was included in 2003 and 2013). While the data reflects the dynamic nature of the ever-changing
contours of national identity- and certainly does not suggest that any identity-related questions
have been settled- a number of interesting trends are suggested (Figure 15).
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Source: ISSP data, responses to prompt: How important are each of the following to be considered
‘Russian’?

Figure 15: Change in relative importance of national identity attributes over time.
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For example, the relative importance of having been born in Russia and possessing Russian
citizenship seems to have experienced modest growth over the past 20 years. In 1995 a shade under
40% of respondents felt that having been born in Russia was very important. The combined
percentage of those believing it to be either very or fairly important was 72.3%. By 2003 both of
these statistics increased significantly to 55.6% and 84.9% respectively. While the percentage of
those believing it be very important tapered off a bit to 51.5% in 2013, the combined percentage
increased slightly to 87.3%. The importance of citizenship similarly grew from 80% in 1995 to
88% and 90% in 2003and 2013 respectively. Similar views about the ability to speak the Russian
language also grew modestly from 81.8% in 1995 to 84.3% in 2003 and 88.3% in 2013.
In addition to the ISSP survey data, the 2008 EVS featured a similar query, with five of the
same eight attributes as the ISSP surveys (Figure 16). The consistency of the findings across data
sets is somewhat remarkable as the EVS results for three of the five attributes (i.e. ability to speak
Russian, respect for the institutions/laws, and having Russian ancestry) were within four
percentage points of the 2013 ISSP results. The importance of living in Russia for a long time was
within 5.9% (ISSP = 87.1% vs. EVS = 81.2%), and the slight difference may be accounted for
with the slight variation in question wording (i.e. most time of life in Russia v. lived in Russia for
a long time). The only attribute whose results differed significantly between the different surveys
was the perceived importance of having been born in Russia. The EVS results (78.4%) seem to
split the difference between the 1995 ISSP results (72.3%) and the 2003 results (84.9%), while
being furthest from the 2013 results (87.3%) to which all of the other attributes otherwise compared
favorably.
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Source: EVS 2008 data, responses to question: How important are each of the following to be
considered ‘Russian’?
Figure 16: Relative importance of various indicators of nationality.

Other attributes experiences only slight growth in perceived importance and in some cases
held virtually steady over this period of time. The importance of having spent most of one’s life in
Russia rose slightly from 80% in 1995 to 85% in 2003 and 2013. Having respect for Russia’s laws
and political institutions experienced a slight dip (85.4% to 82.5%) between 1995 and 2003, before
settling again at 85.7% in 2013. Feeling Russian has seemingly always been important- perhaps
even a necessary pre-requisite- with agreement with this attribute holding at over 90% across all
three surveys.
Perhaps the most intriguing development across these three surveys is the change in
attitudes regarding the perceived importance of religion over the first 20 years of the Russian
Federation. In 1995 only 17.4% felt that being Russian Orthodox was very important, with a slight
majority believing it to be not very important or not important at all (60.3%). From 1995 to 2003
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the response rate for very important doubled from 17.4% to 34.1% while the combined percentage
of very important and fairly important grew from 39.7% to 58.3%. According to the 2013 survey
this grew yet again from 58.3% to 73.6%. Whereas the percentage of those believing religion to
be not important at all was 32.1% in 1995, this shrunk to 8.8% by 2013. While the total percentage
of those feeling this attribute is at least fairly important is still lower than any other listed attribute,
in just under 20 years religion went from practically being a non-factor to being a potentially
important factor when considering the development (and status) of Russian national identity.

3.4

Attitudes Towards Outgroups
Having explored some of the data that speaks to what’s important for the

substance/boundaries of Russian national identity (i.e. ingroup), the final portion of this chapter
will consider some of the perceptions regarding ‘others’ or members of the various out-groups’
within Russia (i.e. immigrants, ethnic minorities). Granted some of these preliminary measures are
indirect at best, asking respondents to consider who they would want as neighbors or who they
would hypothetically ‘allow’ to move to their city, while others try to gauge general levels of trust
or prompt respondents to consider differences between groups in very general terms. However
other measures directly capture the perceptions held by Russians of immigrants as a distinctive
outgroup.
Figure 17 reflects a general recognition of the types of the differences between groups that
may be considered important. However, the question was posed quite generally, and the results
should be interpreted as such. The most significant finding was the identification of cultural
difference as being important, more so than ethnicity and geography. Interestingly, the attributes
identified in the earlier parts of this chapter were all perceived to be relatively less important than
not. 52% of respondents believed ethnicity to be relatively unimportant compared to 44% believing
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this attribute to be a relatively important difference among groups. Religious differences were
relatively unimportant by a 3:2 margin while geographic differences were closer to 2:1.
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Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VT︠s︡IOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity:
Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013.
Response to question: Which kind of differences between various groups do you see as important
or unimportant?
Figure 17: Relative importance of various national ingroups.

When considering the question of whether the government should allow people from less
developed countries entry in to Russia (for purposes of obtaining work, Figure 18), roughly 15%
believed that the government should outright prohibit such entry. Roughly twice that (29.7%)
believed that there should be strict limits on the number of foreigners allowed in to Russia. The
combined percentage of these perspectives matched that of the slightly more receptive belief that
foreigners should be allowed in but with the conditionality of there being a sufficient number of
jobs available.
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Source: EVS 1999 data, responses to question: How about people from less developed countries
coming here to work. Which of the following do you think the government should do?
Figure 18: Attitudes towards others- immigrants seeking employment.

A question within the 2013 Valdai Club survey shifted this hypothetical consideration from
the macro-perspective (i.e. work-related immigration in to the country) to a more personalized
scale, asking respondents to consider who they would allow to move to their city (Figure 19, it is
worth noting that the question text emphasized the hypothetical nature of this question and
included a brief statement that there are no such restrictions on movements within Russia). While
slightly more than a third (36%) indicated no need for restrictions, slightly less than one third (29%)
indicated that such movement should be restricted to citizens only- implying that noncitizens/immigrants should be prohibited from doing so- while further supporting the growing
importance of citizenship as a basis to distinguish ingroup/outgroup membership boundaries.
The most personalized queries asked respondents to consider the types of people they
would dislike as neighbors- a question featured in both the European Values Survey as well as the
commissioned Valdai Club poll. Again focusing attention on previously identified attributes,
religion once again makes somewhat surprising appearance. 41% of respondents identified that
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Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VT︠s︡IOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity:
Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013.
Response to question: Who would you let move to your city?
Figure 19: Attitudes towards others- restrictions on outsiders moving to city

members of unconventional religions or sects were among the least desirable neighbors, placing
within the top-3 of the Valdai Club polling results (Figure 20). Muslims were identified separately
by 14%. Some interesting perceptions of regionality were also revealed via respondents indicated
preference for not living near/regularly interacting with persons from various regions within
Russia and former Soviet republics. Between 20-30% of all respondents identified people from
Central Asia, the North Caucusus, and trans-Caucasus regions as unacceptable neighbors. These
results reveal some fairly specific bases of dislike and distrust; when these specific characteristics
as options to select within the question, only 9% of respondents subsequently identified differences
in ethnicity more generally as a basis for not undesirability.
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Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VT︠s︡IOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity:
Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013.
Response to question: What kind of person would be most unacceptable as a next-door neighbor
or co-worker, someone you see every day?
Figure 20: Attitudes towards others- unacceptable neighbors (Valdai)

While the question asked within the EVS surveys was similar, the presented attributes were
quite different (Figure 21). More interesting than the particulars of any one outgroup are the acrossthe-board increases in the types of people disliked as neighbors from 1998 to 2008, suggesting an
increasing trend of dislike- and possibly distrust- of those perceived generally as ‘others’. One
specific group that stands out is the nearly three-fold increase in the dislike of immigrants and
foreign workers between 1999 and 2008 (from 11.2% to 32.4%).
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Source: EVS data, responses to question: On this list are various groups of people. Could you
please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?
Figure 21: Attitudes towards others- unacceptable neighbors- (EVS)

The 2008 EVS also featured a battery of eight questions pertaining specifically to the
attitudes held by Russian citizens towards immigrants (Figures 22 and 23). The results reflect the
overwhelming distrust of immigrants held by most Russians. When asked whether they agreed
with the statement ‘Today in Russia, there are too many immigrants’, 74.4% agreed or agreed
strongly. When asked about the specific effects of immigrants (i.e. immigrants take away jobs;
immigrants increase crime, etc.) an overwhelming majority of respondents placed themselves on
the negative end of the spectrum. In fact, for the five questions featuring a ten-point scale - with 1
being the most negative view of immigrants and 10 being the least negative - the modal response
was 1. Not only was the most negative response the most often provided response, but in some
instances it was provided twice (e.g. immigrants increase crime) and three times (e.g. immigrants
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Figure 22: Attitudes towards others- immigrants
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Figure 23: Attitudes towards others- effects of immigrants
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will become a threat to society) as often as the next most provided response. The only effect that
immigrants did not have on most citizens is making them feel like a stranger within their own
country, with a majority of respondents disagreeing with that statement.

3.5

Analysis
Most individuals belong to- and identify with- a variety of group identities. The primary

goal of this chapter was to identify the components that help to answer the question: what is
national identity? These preliminary exploratory efforts began by considering the general types of
groups with which respondents most closely identify. Starting with data sources relating to group
identity (including nationality) more generally, I attempted to work up to data sources that were
increasingly focused on national identity, while refining the distinction between nationality (as a
more general concept) and national identity (as a more specific, underlying belief). Identifying the
particular components of one’s belief in national identity in turn contrasts with the secondary,
outward attitudinal manifestations of these concepts (i.e. affirming expressions of pride in country;
relational expressions of country being better than others, etc.)
The data suggests that a sense of belonging with fellow citizens, members of the same
profession, ethnicity, and locality have all played significant roles as the groups which are of the
greatest relative importance to most respondents. Of these identified groups, association with
fellow citizens and with members of the same profession have seemingly alternated as the group
association of greatest relative importance over time. This has similarly occurred on a geographic
basis as Russians have seemingly alternated between stronger feelings of association with locality
and with their country as a whole. While some general trends could be identified across various
datasets, inconsistencies in the findings were also present which dampened the potential for greater
generalization.
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When considering the extent of pride deriving from such associations, the relative
significance of one’s profession dissipates quickly relative to the more pride-inducing associations
of citizenship, ethnicity, and locality. While the pride associated with ethnic identification is not
surprising, the prevalence of such ethnic association remains unclear. Nearly all of the available
data suggests a noticeable increase in the relative feelings of pride associated with Russian
citizenship occurring sometime between 1999 and 2013.
Similarly, there was remarkable consistency in the preliminary findings across both the
EVS and ISSP data as to which features were of the greatest importance to being considered
Russian. Findings suggest that Russians were more prone to tolerating individuals being able to
‘opt in’ to a sense of ‘Russianness’ early on, but gradually shifted to favoring more ascriptive
characteristics (e.g. having been born in Russia; having Russian citizenship) over time. These
findings coincide with the general disdain towards immigrants and foreign workers held by most
Russians, as well as the across the board increase of disliking nearly all ‘others’ over roughly the
same time period.
These findings suggest an image of collective consciousness increasingly cohering around
the basis of citizenship. At the same time, the relative importance of one’s workplace identity
seems to be diminishing. Coinciding with this increased pride in citizenship is the growing belief
in the significance of cultural differences. This is most evident when considering the growing
disdain of immigrants as a distinctive outgroup. This growing perception of cleavages, coupled
with the exogenous economic circumstances (highlighted by the global drop in oil prices on which
the Russian economy depends), increasingly suggests that the collective national consciousness
within Russia reflects that of a closed belief system (Rokeach 1960, Welzel and Inglehart 2007).
Though the data primarily considered within this chapter is unable to definitively assess
whether a distinctive national identity exists, it provides utility in the identification and
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clarification of the general boundaries that loosely exist between the varieties of groups with which
an individual feels a sense of belonging. The preceding analysis attempted to identify the instances
of convergence (and divergence) between data sources, with the belief that greater consistency in
responses to similar questions across different surveys suggests greater reliability in the inferences
derived from the findings. (It was also intended to be a clever way to build up to/introduce/present
the initial summary statistics for the ISSP and EVS data that is featured in subsequent chapters.)
While this chapter was unable to identify the precise boundaries of ‘nationality’, it was
useful to first distinguish this general sense of group identity from what it is not. This end-ofchapter uncertainty as to the significance and scope of nationality as a basis of relevant group
identification mirrors the uncertainty that seemingly exists within the Russian population. Given
both the abstractness and complexity of knowing what nationality ‘is’ this is not unsurprising. The
next chapter seeks to alleviate this uncertainty by using factor analysis to identify the relevant
components of national identification, and develop a model of Russian national identity. If
successful, this constructed model would then be employed to formally test the potential
relationship between one’s sense of national identity and one’s attitudes towards democracy.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

This chapter’s exploration of the development of national identity begins by first
examining respondent’s attitudes towards the perceived importance of various characteristics
relating to one’s membership within an identifiable Russian ‘ingroup’. Within the (previously
described) 2003 ISSP module, one cluster of eight questions asked respondents how important it
is to: have been born in Russia, have Russian citizenship, have lived in Russia for most of one’s
life, speak Russian, be Russian Orthodox, respect Russia’s political institutions and laws, feel
Russian, and have Russian ancestry. Each of these questions is (potentially) a manifest indicator
of a latent general construct of national identity, that is, that the aggregation of individual opinions
regarding such potential aspects of national identity will suggest which of the identified
components contributes to underlying sense of national identity reflected in the minds of surveyed
Russians. Please note that all statistical procedures described in this chapter were performed using
SPSS.

4.1

Does a shared sense of national identity exist within Russia?
This initial cluster of questions was factor analyzed using principal axis factoring (PAF).

A survey of the literature guided the decision to employ PAF over principal components analysis
(PCA), as the latter is only a data reduction technique computed without regard to any underlying
structure, while the former aims to reveal whether latent variables- in this case national identitycause the manifest indicators to covary (Costello and Osborne 1995). As multivariate normality in
the indicators could not be assumed, PAF was chosen over maximum likelihood as the most
appropriate factor extraction method (Fabrigar et al. 1999). The Kaiser-Meyer Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy suggests that the sample is suitable for factoring (KMO = 0.841).
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Employing the principal axis factoring extraction method with an orthogonal (varimax)
rotation initially revealed one underlying factor of significance accounting for 35.5% of the
combined variance among the eight indicators (Table 3). Given the indicators suggested as salient,
this factor seems to reflect the ‘ascriptive’ components of national identity. The resulting factor
matrix provides factor loadings reflecting standardized estimates of the regression slopes
predicting the indicators from the latent factor (Brown 2006). The five salient indicators all had
factor loading values of .61 or greater, meaning that a one standardized unit score increase in the
underlying construct would result in a .61 (or greater) standardized score increase in the given
indicator.
Table 3: Summary of Initial Exploratory Factor Analysis Results-Principal Axis Factoring and
Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have Russian citizenship
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one’s life
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to be Russian Orthodox
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to feel Russian
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor Loadings
.63
.63
.70
.68
.50
.44
.54
.61

Communalities
.40
.40
.49
.46
.25
.19
.29
.37

2.84
35.5

Squaring these factor loadings produces the communality scores, reflecting the proportion
of an indicator’s shared variance explained by the underlying factor. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001)
have suggested communality values of 0.32 (or greater) as the threshold for determining whether
such values are significant. A significant proportion of each of these five indicators variance can
be explained by the underlying factor. Of the eight included indicators five produced significant
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values of common variance- greater than 0.32- suggesting saliency in relation to the underlying
construct. This is substantively interpreted to mean that 32% (or more) of the variance for each
indicator can be explained by the underlying factor. This indicator variance is reflected in the
extracted communality values, which suggests that the underlying factor of national identity
accounts for between 37% (e.g. ancestry) and 49% (e.g. lived in Russia) of the variation among
the salient indicators. Three of the indicators possessed low communality values (<30%),
suggesting that these indicators were not (as) meaningfully related to the primary factor identified.
In the initially run model, the three indicators of questionable saliency loaded at .54, .50, and .44
respectively, resulting in communality values of 0.25, 0.19, and 0.29.
While this preliminary analysis yielded only one factor according to the traditional Kaiser
criterion (eigenvalue > 1.0), the possibility of a second factor was suggested as the next highest
eigenvalue (0.972) just missed this threshold value. It has been noted that this traditional metric is
among the least accurate methods for selecting the number of factors to retain (Velicer and Jackson
1990). Rather researchers should be flexible in their interpretive approach, with Thompson and
Daniel (1996) contending that the consideration of multiple decision rules is not only appropriate
but often desirable. Furthermore, the initial suggestion of one factor is likely a function of the
available data. It has been suggested that EFA will typically reveal the number of factors with
eigenvalues greater than one as being somewhere within a range of values between the number of
variables divided by 3 and the number of variables divided by 5 (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001).
This relates to the corresponding generalization that between 3 and 5 indicators are typically
needed to accurately identify an underlying factor. In this instance, the number of included
indicators was 8; given this provided generalization, the number of factors would be approximated
between 1.6 and 2.7. Given how close the second-highest eigenvalue was to 1.0 (i.e. 0.972), two
efforts to re-run the model were executed: one in which the model was re-run following the
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removal of the three indicators that loaded poorly on the initially identified factor (Table 4) and
another with the imposed constraint of a two-factor solution (Table 5).

Table 4: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring
and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation – Non-Salient Indicators removed

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have Russian citizenship
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one’s life
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor Loadings

Communalities

.68
.65
.71
.63
.57

.46
.42
.50
.40
.32
2.10
42.0

Both revised models better reflected the underlying construct as the amount of the shared
variation explained increased from 35.2% to 42% and 41.1% respectively, suggesting a better
factor grouping of the remaining indicators, as well as supporting the appropriateness of
characterizing the identified factor as ascriptive in nature. Table 4 reflects the model with the
indicators removed, while Table 5 retains the indicators but imposes a two-factor solution. Both
of these models lend support to the idea that this ascriptively oriented conception of national
identity explains a significant proportion of the shared variance in the indicators: having been born
in Russia, whether one has lived most of their life in Russia, has Russian citizenship, Russian
ancestry, and the ability to speak Russian. Each of the five remaining indicators have correlation
values between 0.57 and 0.71, resulting in communality values ranging from 0.32 to 0.50.
The data reported in Table 4 provides additional support for the initial indicator groupings
however its utility (derived from removing available data) should not be overstated. Rather Table
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5 reflects a model better fitting the available data. Imposing a two-factor solution with all 8
indicators resulted in factor loadings not only supporting the preliminary indicator grouping, but
also suggesting a clustering of two of the other three indicators: importance of feeling Russian and
the importance of respecting Russia’s laws and political institutions. This suggests the existence
of a ‘subjective’ national identity component apart from the ascriptive construct. The communality
values for the five originally retained indicators increased slightly or remained the same.

Table 5: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring
and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have Russian citizenship
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one’s life
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to be Russian Orthodox
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to feel Russian
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
Cumulative Variance Explained
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor Loadings
One
Two
.10
.75
.27
.58
.60
.35
.53
.41
.28
.40
.17
.54
.24
.64
.51
.32
2.04
1.25
25.5
15.7

Communalities
.57
.41
.48
.45
.24
.32
.47
.36

41.2

Interestingly, the indicator capturing the importance of being Russian Orthodox generated
a factor loading of 0.40 on the ascriptive construct. While this is above the minimum 0.32 threshold
for significance, suggesting that it might be a minor component of this ascriptive construct, it also
loaded at close to a significant level (0.28) on the secondary construct. Given the weak, yet barely
significant loading on one, the weak and not quite significant loading on the other, that the
difference between the two loadings were quite close, and that the communality score for the
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indicator was 0.24, my initial interpretation is that this indicator is overall not significant but one
to keep an eye on in future iterations of this data set.
While this indicator may not be cleanly loading on only one of the underlying constructs,
it has some company. Three of the indicators cross-loaded- i.e. had factor loadings 0.32 or greater
on both of the identified underlying factors- suggesting that the factors themselves may be
correlated. This makes sense as both of the underlying factors are two different yet inter-related
conceptions of the broader idea of Russian national identity. These factor loadings provide
empirical support for the correlation of these underlying factors, which is consistent with theory,
i.e. that such conceptions of group identities are fluid constructions that individuals may accept
simultaneously. In turn, this suggests that one additional modeling effort is necessary- one in which
an oblique rotation method is applied allowing this correlation among factors to be accounted for
statistically.
One last EFA model was run employing the same principal axis factoring extraction but
varying the rotation method from orthogonal (varimax) to oblique (promax). Oblique methods
statistically allow for underlying factors to correlate, when theoretical justifications exist (Costello
and Osborne 2005). The results of the model are reported in Table 6. The cumulative variance
explained by this two-factor model is 41.2%. The same indicators again cluster together suggesting
ascriptive and subjective orientations towards national identity. Allowing the factors to correlate
resulted in an increase in most of the factor loadings. For example, the indicator reflecting the
importance of having been born in Russia increased from 0.75 to 0.89. Substantively, this would
indicate that a one standardized unit increase in the underlying ascriptive identity construct would
result in a 0.89 standardized score increase in the ‘born in Russia’ indicator. More than half (0.57)
of this indicator’s shared variance is explained by this factor.
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Table 6: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring
and Promax (oblique) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have Russian citizenship
Important- lived in Russia for most of one’s life
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to be Russian Orthodox
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to feel Russian
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
Eigenvalues (post-rotation)
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor
Loadings
One
Two
-.23
.89
.59
.15
.58
.26
.47
.16
.37
.59
.68
.16
.49
2.89
.40
36.1
5.1

Correlations Commun.
One
.74
.64
.68
.64
.47
.35
.45
.59

Two
.35
.45
.54
.57
.40
.56
.68
.48

2.72

2.11

.57
.41
.48
.45
.24
.32
.47
.36

In turn, allowing the factors to correlate produced slightly stronger factor loadings for the
two indicators suggesting a subjective identity orientation. The importance of ‘respecting
laws/political institutions’ and ‘feeling Russian’ loaded at 0.59 and 0.68 respectively. Perhaps
more importantly, allowing the factors to correlate ‘cleaned up’ the model by eliminating the
previously identified cross-loadings. Finally, the significance of the previously noted religiosity
indicator declined slightly, supporting the initial conclusion that it is likely not substantively
significant in the context of the current model.
Collectively, these preliminary results suggest that there exists a nascent underlying
conception of what is important in terms of belonging to a broader Russian ‘ingroup’. The results
suggest that two underlying factors of interest manifest themselves- an ascriptive conceptualization
of national identity and a subjective conceptualization. The subjective conceptualization accounts
for a significant proportion of the variance in the indicators measuring one’s respect towards the
laws and political institutions of Russia, feeling Russian, and the importance of speaking Russian
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(although the initial cross-loading of the latter disappeared once the oblique rotational method was
used).
Intuitively this makes sense- where one may cognitively opt-in to feeling positively
towards institutions and laws, and/or feeling Russian, one does not exercise the same psychological
choice in terms of deciding where one is born, who their parents are, or their initial citizenship
status. It also makes sense that the indicator reflecting the importance of speaking Russian is
partially captured by both underlying constructs. While one’s primary language is significantly
determined by the familial and societal context that one is born in to, it is also possible to choose
additional languages later in life. Indeed, the theory-driven acknowledgment of this possibility
guided the decision to iteratively work towards an oblique extraction method, in order to account
for this potential correlation among the underlying factors.

4.2

How stable is this sense of identity over time?
Following this preliminary exploration of the 2003 ISSP national identity module, the same

EFA techniques were applied to the preceding 1995 ISSP module as well as the recently released
2013 module. Except for the question relating to the importance of Russian ancestry (which was
absent from the 1995 survey), the same indicators were present across all three surveys. Although
the precise values differed slightly, the same indicators generally loaded in similar ways,
suggesting a similar significance of influence upon common variance.
Employing the same principal axis factoring method with orthogonal rotation on the 1995
module resulted in a preliminary two-factor solution accounting for 37.3% of the combined
variance among the seven indicators (Table 7). The same four indicators- birthplace, citizenship,
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Table 7: 1995- Summary of Initial Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring
and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have Russian citizenship
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one’s life
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to be Russian Orthodox
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to feel Russian
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
Cumulative Variance Explained
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor Loadings
One
Two
.70
.22
.63
.22
.70
.50
.34
.29
.18
.18
.58
.14
.52
1.75
.86
25
12.3

Communalities
.50
.44
.53
.37
.12
.37
.29

37.3

longevity, language- generated standardized factor loadings on the underlying construct ranging
between 0.50 and 0.70, and achieved communality values greater than 0.32. This suggests that the
underlying factor of national identity accounts for between 37% (e.g. language) and 53% (e.g.
lived in Russia) of the variation among the salient indicators, while a one-unit increase in the
underlying ascriptive national identity factor results in a standardized score increase between 0.50
and 0.70 in each of the indicators.
Varying the rotation method from orthogonal to oblique again resulted in slight increases
across most of the factor loadings (Table 8). The same indicators again clustered around two
underlying factors suggesting ascriptive and subjective orientations towards national identity,
while also minimizing the prevalence of cross-loadings. For example, within the suggested
ascriptive factor the indicator reflecting the importance of having been born in Russia increased
from 0.70 to 0.77, while half of this indicator’s shared variance is explained by the underlying
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Table 8: 1995- Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis
Factoring and Promax (oblique) Rotation

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have Russian citizenship
Important- lived in Russia for most of one’s life
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to be Russian Orthodox
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to feel Russian
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
Eigenvalues (post-rotation)
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor
Loadings
One
Two
.77
.64
.72
.21
.46
.27
.11
.60
.54
2.18
.43
31.1
6.2

Correlations Commun.
One
.70
.66
.73
.58
.33
.34
.28

Two
.28
.39
.40
.46
.25
.61
.54

2.09

1.33

.50
.44
.53
.37
.12
.37
.29

ascriptive factor. Within the suggested ‘subjective’ factor, the importance of ‘respecting
laws/political institutions’ and ‘feeling Russian’ loaded at 0.60 and 0.54 respectively. In contrast
with the 2003 data, the communality value for the ‘feeling Russian’ indicator registered just under
the 0.32 threshold for significance, while the religiosity indicator barely registered.
The final EFA efforts were applied to the recently available 2013 ISSP national identity
data module. Similar to the 2003 module, preliminary efforts initially suggested only one
underlying factor reflecting 43.7% of the total variance (Table 9). In contrast with the 2003 data,
7 of the 8 indicators achieved initial communality values greater than 0.32, with factor loadings
similar to- or greater than- the 2003 module. The “feeling Russian” indicator experienced the
largest gains with its factor loading increasing from 0.54 in 2003 to 0.69 in 2013.
Given the lessons learned from the 2003 module efforts, the orthogonal EFA was re-run
following the imposition of a two-factor solution (Table 10). The percentage of total variance
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Table 9: 2013- Summary of Initial Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring
and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have Russian citizenship
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one’s life
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to be Russian Orthodox
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to feel Russian
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor Loadings
.65
.67
.71
.68
.60
.53
.69
.73

Communalities
.42
.45
.51
.47
.28
.36
.48
.53

3.49
43.7

Table 10: 2013- Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and
Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation- Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have Russian citizenship
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one’s life
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to be Russian Orthodox
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to feel Russian
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
Cumulative Variance Explained
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor Loadings
One
Two
.28
.64
.27
.67
.61
.38
.51
.44
.41
.33
.39
.48
.27
.79
.43
.60
2.08
1.79
26
22.3

Communalities
.48
.52
.52
.46
.28
.36
.69
.55

48.3
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explained again increased (from 43.7% to 48.3%), with the same relative clustering of indicators
around the two underlying factors. The one exception was the indicator for Russian ancestry. In
2003 this indicator loaded primarily on the first factor while loading more prominently on the
second factor in 2013.
Cross-loadings were prominent once more, suggesting a correlation among the underlying
factors and prompting the final EFA with oblique rotation (Table 11). Once again, allowing the
factors to correlate resulted in stronger primary factor loadings and reduced the prevalence of
cross-loadings across factors. The primary loadings for ‘born in Russia’ and ‘having Russian
citizenship’ increased on the ascriptive factor (from 0.64 and 0.67 to 0.70 and 0.76 respectively),
while the secondary factor loadings all but disappeared. Similarly, the primary loading for ‘feeling
Russian’ increased (from 0.79 to 0.91) on the subjective factor.

Table 11: 2013- Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis
Factoring and Promax (oblique) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have Russian citizenship
Important- lived in Russia for most of one’s life
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to be Russian Orthodox
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to feel Russian
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
Eigenvalues (post-rotation)
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor
Loadings
One
Two
.70
.76
.15
.60
.29
.43
.19
.37
.26
.39
-.10
.91
.23
.56
3.54
.32
44.3
4.0

Correlations Commun.
One
.69
.72
.72
.65
.51
.54
.57
.64

Two
.51
.52
.60
.61
.46
.58
.83
.73

3.26

3.02

.48
.52
.52
.46
.28
.36
.69
.55
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Finally, allowing the factors to correlate shifted the percentage of total variance among the
indicators explained by each of the underlying factors. With the orthogonal rotation, results
suggested that the ascriptive factor accounted for 26% of the variation among the indicators. While
the subjective factor accounted for 22.3%. Once the correlation among factors was accounted for,
results suggested that the ascriptive factor accounted for a much greater amount of variation
(44.3%) as compared to the subjective factor (4.0%).
The existence of three datasets covering a period of 18 years provides the opportunity to
evaluate changes in attitudes relating to national identity over time. Within the 1995 data
exploratory factor analysis suggested two distinct yet inter-related factors pertaining to national
identity. The initial clustering of indicators suggests one conception of national identity that is
ascriptive in basis, and another that may be subjectively achieved. The ascriptive basis of national
identity is reflected in the indicators reflecting the importance of: having been born in Russia,
having lived in Russia for most of one’s life, having Russian citizenship, and the ability to speak
Russian. Unsurprisingly, this latter linguistic indicator cross-loaded and was associated with both
of the underlying factors across all three data sets. The indicators measuring the importance of
one’s respect for Russian political institutions and laws, and the importance of feeling Russian
loaded on the second underlying factor, suggesting a subjective dimension to national identity.
Qualifying this observation somewhat is the recognition that the ‘feeling Russian’ indicator fell
just short (0.29) of the communality threshold for significance in 1995 (0.32), while ‘respect for
political institutions/laws’ was only slightly greater (0.37).
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Table 12: Orthogonal Factor Loadings over Time (Tables 5, 7, and 10 combined)

Russia
Item
One
Important…born in R
.70
Important…R
.63
citizenship
Important…lived in R .70
most life
Important…speak R
.50
Important… R Orthodox .29
Important… respect R .18
laws/inst
Important…feel R
.14
Important…R ancestry
Eigenvalues
1.75
Percentage of Total 25
Variance
Cumulative
Variance
Explained
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

1995
2003
2013
Two Comm. One Two Comm. One Two Comm
.50
.75 .10
.57
.64 .28
.48
.22
.44
.58 .27
.41
.67 .27
.52
.22

.53

.60

.35

.48

.61

.38

.52

.34
.18
.58

.37
.12
.37

.53
.40
.17

.41
.28
.54

.45
.24
.32

.51
.41
.39

.44
.33
.48

.46
.28
.36

.52

.29

.24 .64
.51 .32
2.04 1.25
25.5 15.7

.47
.36

.27 .79
.43 .60
2.08 1.79
26 22.3

.69
.55

.86
12.3
37.3

41.2

48.3

While the EFA efforts involving the 2003 data initially suggested only one underlying
factor, the aforementioned theoretical justifications resulted in the imposition of the two-factor
solution which ultimately resulted in a better fit with the data (41.2% of total variance explained
versus 35.5%). The same indicators again loaded on the same underlying factors. An indicator
measuring the importance of having Russian ancestry was added to the 2003 module, loading
primarily on the suggested ascriptive factor. The indicator relating to feeling Russian- whose
proportion of shared variance previously clocked in at a less-than-significant 0.29 in 1995experienced the largest increase of any of the indicators. In 2003 the communality score grew to
0.47- with a factor loading of 0.64- seemingly anchoring the second underlying factor.

.40
.46
.25
.61

.54

.73
.58
.33
.34

.28

2.09 1.33

.39

.66

.59

.16
.40
5.1

.49
2.89
36.1

.48

.68

.56

.40

.57

.54

.45

2.72 2.11

.45

.68

.35

.47

.29

.16

.64

.26

.59

.37

.12

.68

.15

.64

.37

.47

.58

.59

.37

.53

.44

.36

.47

.32

.24

.45

.48

.41

3.54
44.3

.23

.32
4.0

.56

.91

.39

.26

-.10

.19

.29

.15

.37

.43

.60

.76

.73

.83

.58

.46

.61

.60

.52

3.26 3.02

.64

.57

.54

.51

.65

.72

.72

.55

.69

.36

.28

.46

.52

.52

1995
2003
2013
Loadings
Corr.
Comm. Loadings
Corr.
Comm. Loadings
Corr.
Comm.
One Two One Two
One Two One Two
One Two One Two
.77
.70 .28
.50
.89 -.23 .74 .35
.57
.70
.69 .51
.48

Item
Important…born
in R
Important…R
.64
citizenship
Important…lived .72
in R most life
Important…speak .46
R
Important…
R .27 .11
Orthodox
Important…
.60
respect
R
laws/inst
Important…feel
.54
R
Important…R
ancestry
Eigenvalues
2.18 .43
Percentage
of 31.1 6.2
Total Variance
Eigenvalues
(post-rotation)
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Russia

Table 13: Oblique Factor Loadings over Time (Tables 6, 8, and 11 combined)
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Interestingly, the preliminary EFA efforts involving the 2013 data initially suggested only
one underlying factor. Had the 2013 data been run in a vacuum, independent from any experience
with prior data or theoretical consideration one might have concluded that there was no real
contestation among competing conceptions of national identity. However, when the two-factor
solution was imposed the same indicator clusters emerged, suggesting that a two-factor solution
better served to explain the variance among the indicators. When examining the final results for
each of the three datasets, the percentage of total variance explained by the underlying factors
increased across each subsequent dataset (37.3% in 1995, 41.2% in 2003, and 48.3% in 2013).
Two of the indicators within the suggested ascriptive factor experienced the largest changes
overall. The communality score for the importance of feeling Russian indicator increased from
0.47 in 2003 to 0.69 in 2013, while ‘importance of Russian ancestry’ increased from 0.36 to 0.55,
for increases of 0.22 and 0.19 respectively. The indicators within the suggested ascriptive factor
experiencing the biggest changes were importance of having been born in Russia (communality
scores: 0.57 in 2003, 0.48 in 2013; change of -0.09) and importance of having Russian citizenship
(0.41 to 0.52; change of 0.11). One possible explanation for these changes may be the passage of
the 2003 Citizenship Laws which revised the laws previously in effect from 1993. These changes
solidified the jus sanguinis basis of citizenship, diminishing the de jure importance of having been
born on Russian soil. This in turn may help to explain the relative increase in both the importance
of feeling Russian (communality scores: 0.29 in 1995, 0.47 in 2003, and 0.69 in 2013) and the
importance of having Russian ancestry (communality scores: 0.36 in 2003, and 0.55 in 2013). The
0.69 communality value associated with the ‘feeling Russian’ indicator was the highest of all
indicators in the 2013 dataset, perhaps suggesting a simultaneous increase in the relative strength
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of national pride and identity, along with the increase in uncertainty as to where the precise
boundaries of membership lie.
Some interesting results emerge when examining some of the individual indicators over
time. For example, the indicator relating to ‘feeling Russian’ was not significant in 1995
(communality value of 0.29) but was in 2003 and 2013. While just missing the threshold for
significance in 1995 nearly 70% of the indicator’s shared variance was explained by the underlying
factor in 2013- the highest percentage relative to the other measured indicators. Similarly, there
has been an interesting uptick in the perceived importance of being Russian Orthodox. While the
indicator was nowhere close to salient in 1995 (communality = 0.12), it experienced a significant
increase in 2003 (0.24) and seemingly continued to grow in importance over time (communality
= 0.28 in 2013). It will be interesting to see in future ISSP national identity modules whether the
importance of this indicator will continue to grow slowly over time.

4.3

Analysis
When considering the question of whether a cohesive sense of national identity exists, the

answer would be a qualified yes. Preliminary EFA on all three datasets suggest at least one
underlying factor accounting for a significant amount of variation among the selected indicators.
Further exploration suggests that there is a likely two correlated dimensions within the broader
underlying factor. Given the pattern of indicator clustering- and the remarkable consistency across
time- it is believed that these dimensions reflect both an ascriptive and subjective aspect to national
identity. The ascriptive dimension is reflected by the indicators measuring the perceived
importance of: having been born in Russia, having Russian citizenship, and having lived in Russia
for most of one’s life. Setting aside the perceived importance associated with these attributes, the
ability to affirm whether any of these attributes apply to a given individual is fairly objective, and
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ultimately comes from outside the control of the individual. By contrast, the subjective dimension
reflects the value associated with the attributes that are felt by any individual, including the extent
to which importance is assigned to: feeling Russian, and respecting Russian laws and political
institutions. One indicator-the importance of being able to speak Russian- loaded on both
dimensions, while the indicator measuring the importance of being Russian Orthodox failed to
load on either.
Given these dual conceptions of national identity, the question of whether there has been a
stable conception of identity over time becomes more a question of which conception of identity
is prevalent at any particular time. For example, in 1995 the indicators of having been born in
Russia and having lived in Russia for most of one’s life were the indicators with the strongest
factor loadings (followed closely by possessing Russian citizenship). While these markers of
national identity were discrete in their indication of membership (i.e. one was or was not born in
Russia, does or does not have Russian citizenship) and thus were easily recognizable, they were
agnostic as to the substantive contours of membership and belonging.
Over time, this more inclusive perspective started to shift as the perceived importance of
de jure citizenship started to wane while the de facto importance of feeling Russian grew steadily
(Table 12: 0.52 -> 0.64 -> 0.79). Perhaps the most interesting indicator reflecting this shift was the
one added to the 2003 dataset measuring the perceived importance associated with having Russian
ancestry. While just significant in 2003 with a communality score of 0.36, the indicator initially
loaded on the ascriptive dimension of identity. By 2013 the communality score was 0.55 (the
second highest of all measured indicators) and the indicator loaded on the subjective dimension of
identity, helping to solidify this feeling-based sense of Russianness as the most important
component of one’s sense of Russianness.
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This shift in public attitudes followed a significant policy change which formally redefined the basis of Russian citizenship, shifting from a jus soli basis- affirmed shortly after the
collapse of the Soviet Union- to a jus sanguinis basis. Subsequent reaction to- or at least knowledge
of- this policy shift is believed to drive the significant increase in attitudes pertaining to the
importance of having Russian ancestry (Table 12: 0.32 -> 0.60) while a bit of corresponding
uncertainty likely explains the surge in support for the more subjectively-oriented basis of ‘feeling
Russian’.
For a democratic political system to have value, the people have to possess a generally
agreed upon sense of who ‘We the People’ are. This chapter has explored how a series of indicators
measuring the perceived importance of national identity tend to cluster around two present yet
distinct dimensions of national identity. The relative strength of the factor loadings suggests the
relative importance for each of the two broader dimensions- ascriptive and subjective- as well as
the relative strength of association between the indicators and these dimensions. Looking at these
measures of strength over time suggests that while Russians maintain a strongly held belief in the
relative importance of indicators (associated with) measuring national identity, there is a near everpresent ongoing contestation as to which indicators reflect the metrics of greatest importance.
Given these trends it is anticipated that the next chapter’s efforts to explore the relationship
between national identity and attitudes towards democracy will initially show a positive
relationship within the earlier dataset, followed by a corresponding weakening of said relationship
as reflected in the datasets over time.
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NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS
DEMOCRACY

The first steps in chapter 5 involved data screening procedures and its preparation for use
in the later measurement and structural models. One of the standard assumptions is that all relevant
endogenous variables are normally distributed. As is indicated in Table 1, this assumption was not
violated by any of the variables used in this study as the values for skewness and kurtosis were all
below the generally accepted threshold levels of 3 and 10 respectively.

Table 14: Univariate Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality- Preliminary Data

N= 2383

Mean

Std. Deviation

Skewness

Kurtosis

<3

<10

(valid/missing)
Indicator

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Std.

Statistic

Error

Std.
Error

V11- Imp born in..

2331/52

1.63

.84

1.26

.05

.85

.11

V12- Imp citizenship

2323/60

1.56

.78

1.36

.05

1.32

.11

V13- Imp most life

2332/51

1.62

.81

1.18

.05

.62

.11

V14- Imp- speak Rus

2345/38

1.58

.85

1.36

.05

.94

.11

V15- Imp Rus Orth

2246/137

2.25

1.13

.31

.05

-1.30

.11

V16- Imp pol inst/law

2271/112

1.73

.87

1.04

.05

.28

.11

V17- Imp feel R

2315/68

1.42

.69

1.74

.05

2.92

.11

V18- Imp- Rus ances

2318/65

1.85

.94

.84

.05

1.31

.11

V26 – Proud D works

1939/444

3.81

.80

-.68

.06

-.18

.11

The second consideration was the handling of missing data. Given the relatively large
sample size, the effect of missing data is not thought to be of much concern. A quick examination
of the variables reveals a relatively small percentage of missing values for all of the indicators with
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the notable exception of the indicator measuring perceived pride in Russia’s democracy. With
more than 18% of respondents not providing an answer to the question of how much pride they
feel for the way democracy works in Russia, it was believed that missing values for this indicator
likely violated the missing completely at random (MCAR) distribution assumption, thus
disqualifying a strategy of mean imputation for all variables. To avoid the potential for magnifying
the effects of systematic bias arising from the unknown nature of the missing responses, casewise
deletion of those 444 respondents was employed, lowering the N to 1939. Following this deletion,
mean imputation was used for all remaining cases of missing values. Significant consideration of
outliers was not needed given the nature of the data (Likert scale responses with constrained ranges
of either 4 or 5 scale points). The univariate summary statistics for this trended data are reported
in Table 15.

Table 15: Univariate Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality-Data with Trend Replacement

N= 1939

Mean

Std. Deviation

Skewness

Kurtosis

<3

<10

(valid/missing)
Indicator

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Std.

Statistic

Error

Std.
Error

V11- Imp born in..

1906/33

1.67

.86

1.17

.06

.57

.11

V12- Imp citizenship

1901/38

1.61

.80

1.24

.06

.91

.11

V13- Imp most life

1910/29

1.64

.83

1.13

.06

.45

.11

V14- Imp- speak Rus

1921/18

1.62

.87

1.27

.06

.66

.11

V15- Imp Rus Orth

1845/94

2.31

1.15

.23

.06

-1.38

.11

V16- Imp pol inst/law

1876/63

1.76

.88

1.0

.06

.19

.11

V17- Imp feel R

1895/44

1.46

.72

1.68

.06

2.56

.11

V18- Imp- Rus ances

1900/39

1.89

.95

.79

.06

-.40

.11

V26 – Proud D works

1939

3.18

.80

-.68

.06

-.18

.11
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Furthermore, multi-collinearity was considered by examining the Pearson correlations
among the observed variables (presented in Table 16 below). None of the observed variables had
correlations of significant magnitude, and the absence of significant multi-collinearity was
assumed.
Table 16: Pearson Correlation Coefficients among the Observed Variables

v11

v12

v13

v14

V15

V16

V17

V18

V11- Imp born in.R.

1

V12- Imp citizenship

.47

1

V13- Imp most life

.43

.38

1

V14- Imp- Rus lang

.35

.39

.50

1

V15- Imp- Rus Orth

.26

.20

.27

.37

1

V16- Imp resp pol inst/law

.18

.26

.26

.26

.22

1

V17- Imp feel R

.24

.28

.36

.39

.20

.39

1

V18- Imp- Rus ancestry

.42

.33

.37

.32

.38

.21

.36

1

V26- Proud D works

.17

.14

.14

.13

.09

.16

.20

.14

5.1

V26

1

Analysis of Measurement Models
A preliminary structural model (Figure 24) was the first formal effort testing the central

hypothesis concerning the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy.
This preliminary model achieved a poor fit to the data, resulting in a chi-square value of 422.72
(d.f.= 25) and fit indices of AGFI = .918, CFI = .889, and RMSEA = .091. Both the AGFI and CFI
failed to surpass the generally accepted threshold of .95. While RMSEA values at or below .05 are
generally preferred, values between .05 and .08 are often considered acceptable. The RMSEA for
this preliminary model is thus considered too great to be satisfactory. Improvements were thus
sought in order to better fit the model to the data.
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The next step was ensuring that the measurement model was satisfactory before proceeding
to any further testing of structural model relationships. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to
verify the factor structures suggested in the preceding chapter’s analysis and to assess the overall
fit of the model to the data. Paralleling the sequence of data considerations from the preceding
chapter, the first efforts involved the 2003 ISSP data. Recalling the earlier decision to impose a
two factor solution though only one factor was suggested by the preliminary results, the first CFA
model run as a baseline tested the model fit of a one factor model to the data (Figure 25). This
initial CFA model fit the data rather poorly 5, producing a chi-square value of 438.29 (d.f.= 20) and
fit indices of AGFI = .909, CFI = .883, and RMSEA = .104 (for a comparison of measurement
model fit indices see Table 17 below). The preliminary two factor model fit the data slightly better,
but fit indices suggest that improvements were still necessary (Figure 26).
An examination of the modification indices resulting from the preliminary two factor
model suggested that co-varying the disturbance terms (e1 and e2, e6 and e7, and e1 and e8
respectively) would substantially improve the fit of the model. The model was revised (as indicated
in Figure 26) and re-run with the indicated co-variances and a significant improvement in model
fit was achieved. Chi-square was reduced from 377.26 to 178.32, the values for GFI, AGFI, and
CFI rose to .980, .954, and .954 respectively, while the RMSEA dropped below the .08 threshold.
This iterative process was repeated for the 2013 and 1995 datasets with the results reported in
Table 17. While the model fit indices suggest that the specified model is a relatively good fit to
the data, the resulting estimates measuring the effects of each latent on the dependent variable were
(0.86) that exists between the two latent factors.

5

Rule of Thumb: Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Adjusted GFI (AGFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) values greater
than 0.95 are desirable, Similarly Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) values less than 0.04 and Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) values less than 0.08 are preferred.
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Table 17: Comparison of Measurement Model Fit Indices

CFA Measurement Chi-sq. DF

p

Model

Chi-

RMR GFI AGFI

CFI

RMSEA

sq./d.f.

2003
One Factor

438.29

20

<.001

21.91

.040 .949 .909

.883

.104

Preliminary

377.26

19

<.001

19.86

.037 .954 .913

.900

.099

Revised

178.32

16

<.001

11.14

.026 .980 .954

.954

.072

224.06

19

<.001

11.79

.023 .967 .937

.949

.084

18

<.001

8.75

.018 .974 .948

.965

.072

2013
Preliminary
Revised

157.52

1995
Preliminary

209.46

13

<.001

16.11

.037 .964 .923

.902

.098

Revised

93.03

11

<.001

8.46

.033 .983 .957

.959

.069

While it was possible to achieve a relatively good model fit to the ISSP data, said data is
limited insofar as it only contains one indicator for the dependent variable of interest: attitudes
regarding democracy. This limitation (combined with the high correlation between the competing
latent constructs and the inflated standard errors) led to applying the same modeling procedures to
one additional dataset. The 2008 European Values Survey (EVS) contains most (but not all) of the
same independent variable indicators as well as more indicators capturing respondents’ attitudes
towards democracy. The first step involving the European Values Survey data was repeating the
factor analysis procedures featured in the previous analytical chapter to ensure that the underlying
independent variable factor constructs were suitably comparable. Nothing in these results
suggested anything to the contrary, which are reported in Tables 18-20 below.
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V26- pride in democracy
How important is it toV11- have been born in Russia
V12- have Russian citizenship
V13- have lived in R for most of one’s life
V14- speak Russian
V15- be Russian Orthodox
V16- respect R pol institutions/laws
V17- feel Russian
V18- have Russian ancestry

Figure 24: Preliminary Test of Structural Model (2003)
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How important is it toV11- have been born in Russia
V12- have Russian citizenship
V13- have lived in R for most of one’s life
V14- speak Russian
V15- be Russian Orthodox
V16- respect R pol institutions/laws
V17- feel Russian
V18- have Russian ancestry

Figure 25: Preliminary CFA Measurement Model- One Factor (2003)
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How important is it toV11 been born in Russia
V12- have Russian citizenship
V13- have lived in - have
R for most of one’s life
V14- speak Russian
V15- be Russian Orthodox
V16- respect R pol institutions/laws
V17- feel Russian
V18- have Russian ancestry

Figure 26: Preliminary CFA Measurement Model- Two Factor (2003)
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How important is it toV11- have been born in Russia
V12- have Russian citizenship
V13- have lived in R for most of one’s life
V14- speak Russian
V15- be Russian Orthodox
V16- respect R pol institutions/laws
V17- feel Russian
V18- have Russian ancestry

Figure 27: Revised CFA Measurement Model (2003)
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V26- pride in democracy
How important is it toV11- have been born in Russia
V12- have Russian citizenship
V13- have lived in R for most of one’s life
V14- speak Russian
V15- be Russian Orthodox
V16- respect R pol institutions/laws
V17- feel Russian
V18- have Russian ancestry

Figure 28: Revised Test of Initial Structural Model (2003)
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Table 18: Summary of Initial Exploratory Factor Analysis Results-Principal Axis Factoring and
Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have lived in Russia for a long time
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor Loadings Communalities
.28
.44
.46
.27
.29

.53
.66
.67
.52
.54
1.73
34.6

Table 19: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring
and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have lived in Russia for a long time
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor Loadings
.60
.62
.80
.50
.51
1.89
37.7

Communalities

.51
.07
-.45
.02
.11
.47
9.3

.62
.38
.85
.25
.26
47.0

Table 20: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring
and Promax (oblique) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia
Item
Important to have been born in Russia
Important to have lived in Russia for a long time
Important to be able to speak Russian
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions
Important to have Russian ancestry
Eigenvalues
Percentage of Total Variance
Eigenvalues (post-rotation)
>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Factor
Loadings
One
Two
-.04
.80
.37
.36
-.10
.96
.33
.25
.35
.25
2.37
.79
47.4
15.8

Correlations Commun.
One
.34
.54
.92
.45
.46

Two
.78
.53
.36
.41
.41

1.89

.47

.62
.38
.85
.25
.26
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Once the similarity between the constructs underlying the independent variable indicators
across datasets was confirmed, attention was turned to analyzing the factor structure(s) underlying
the indicators reflecting respondent’s attitudes regarding democracy. Again following the same
data-screening procedures undertaken with the independent variable, treatment of the dependent
variable indicators began with some preliminary univariate summary statistics.
When asked the question, “On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?” a majority
of respondents expressed a lack of satisfaction with the development of democracy within Russia.
Of the 1500+ respondents queried, only 51 (4%) answered that they were ‘very satisfied’ while
more than 60% expressed that they were not very satisfied or not satisfied at all. The summary of
respondents’ attitudes regarding their satisfaction with their perceptions of the actual development
of democracy within Russia is contrasted with responses to roughly analogous comparative
abstractions (e.g. rule by a strong leader, experts, the army, and a hypothetical consideration of
having a democratic political system as understood by individual respondents) in Table 21 below.
These findings suggest that respondents’ valuation of having a democracy is positive in the abstract,
but the commensurate perceptions of the actual development of democracy within Russia leaves
much to be desired.
Another cluster of indictors delves further into the possible bases of criticism by asking the
respondents their perspective of what makes democracy suboptimal. While squabbling and
indecision were easily the most widely agreed upon basis of criticism (with 58% of respondents
agreeing) even this criticism was outweighed by respondents’ support of the Churchillian notion
that democracy may have its problems but is still better than the alternatives.
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Table 21: Attitudes towards Democracy in Russia- Satisfaction with Current System and
Comparisons to Specific Alternatives

Russia (N = 1504)
Item
Satisfaction- Dem development in R?
Strong leader unbothered elec/parliam
Experts- not govt- decide for country
Having army rule country
Having democratic pol system

Satisfied/
Good
Very
Fairly
4.0
34.4
21.6
36.9
8.4
40.6
3.1
13.9
16.3
61.2

(valid)
38.4
58.5
49.0
17.0
77.5

Unsatisfied/
Bad
Fairly Very (valid)
47.9
13.7
61.6
29.3
12.2
41.5
38.1
12.9
51.0
40.3
42.7
83.0
16.7
5.8
22.5

%
Missing

14.6
13.6
21.9
13.8
19.7

Table 22: General Criticisms of Democracy and Comparison to non-Specific Alternative

Russia (N = 1504)
Item
D: Problems but > than alt’s
In D, econ system runs badly
D = indecisive/too much squabbling
D not good maintain order

Agree
Strongly
20.7
6.1
16.5
9.9

60.2
29.1
41.3
43.0

%
Missing

Disagree
(valid)
80.9
35.2
57.9
52.9

16.3
58.4
38.1
42.6

Strongly
2.8
6.4
4.0
4.5

(valid)
19.1
64.8
42.1
47.1

21.0
22.1
18.4
22.5

Following this cursory examination of the dependent variable indicators, a preliminary
structural model was attempted involving latent constructs for ‘national identity’, and ‘democratic
attitudes’ (Figure 29). The preliminary modeling efforts with the EVS data fared better than the
initial efforts involving the ISSP data. While the number of indicators (5) for national identity
disallowed the testing of differing conceptions of national identity, it did effectively allow for
testing the relationship between national identity (in the aggregate) and a better latent construct for
attitudes towards democracy. The model fit estimates suggest a good fit between the model and
the data, and the indicator estimates are statistically significant.
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Additionally, the presence of an explicit measure of generally trust in fellow citizens
allowed for a limited form of subgroup analysis. The survey included the question “Generally
speaking would you say that you that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people”, with responses recorded in a dichotomous fashion (most can be
trusted/can’t be too careful). The final modeling results that follow (Figures 29-31) reflect the full
sample after handling missing data (N = 923), one subgroup of respondents indicating that they
generally trust people (N = 235) and another subgroup indicating that you can’t be too careful (N
= 635). The coefficients presented reflect standardized factor loadings.

Table 23: General Degree of Trust in Others

Russia (N = 1504)
Item
Most ppl can be trusted
Cannot be too careful

29.9%
70.1%

The modeling results suggest a positive relationship between national identity and
democratic attitudes. As a one standardized unit increase of national identity occurs, there is a 0.19
unit decrease in the democratic attitudes construct. Given the coding nature of individual indicators,
substantively this means that as the perceived importance of national identity measures increase,
having a democratic system is seen as better, democracy is viewed more favorably, and
respondents disagree with negative characterizations of democracy. The strength of the individual
indicator loadings suggests that speaking Russian and living most of one’s life in Russia are
perceived as more important across each of the models relative to having Russian ancestry or
respect for political institutions.
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Figure 29: Preliminary Test of Structural Model with EVS data (full)
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Figure 30: Test of Structural Model with EVS data- ‘Trust’ subgroup (N = 265)
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Figure 31: Test of Structural Model with EVS data- ‘No Trust’ subgroup (N = 635)
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Table 24: Comparison of Model Fit Indices- EVS 2008

Structural Model Chi-sq. DF

p

Chi-

RMR GFI AGFI CFI

RMSEA

sq./d.f.

Full

93.5

33

<.001

2.83

.016 .981 .968

.967

.045

Generally

91.1

33

<.001

2.76

.032 .938 .896

.901

.082

76.1

33

<.001

2.31

.18 .976 .960

.965

.045

trusting
Generally
cautious

This general relationship also holds true in each of the subgroup analyses, with only minor,
predictable variation in the indicator estimates. For example, the strength of the relationship
between national identity and attitudes towards democracy for those within the more trusting
subgroup was 0.22 versus 0.18 for those in the generally more cautious subgroup (as compared to
the 0.19 value for the full sample). As the more cautious subgroup was roughly twice the size of
the more trusting subgroup, it was not surprising to find most of the indicator values for the full
sample aligned more closely with the more cautious subgroup.
While it was not possible to test differing compositions of national identity, examining the
communality scores within the subgroup analysis suggests variation in the relative importance of
the indicators supporting each of the latent constructs. For example, within the trust subgroup the
latent construct for national identity accounts for 42% of the variation in the ‘importance of being
born in Russia’ indicator. For those in the generally cautious subgroup, this value is only 20%.
Similar variation was also detected among the dependent variable indicators across the two
subgroups. 62% of the variation in the measure of democracy being indecisive and prone to
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squabbling was accounted for by the democratic attitudes construct within the generally cautious
subgroup; this value was 48% within the generally trusting subgroup. Conversely, the variation
accounted for in the indicator measuring the belief that democracies are not good at maintaining
order was 0.46 and 0.64 for the generally cautious and generally trusting subgroups respectively.
An interpretation of these results suggest the perceived importance of having been born in
Russia is more than twice as significant a component of the conception of national identity for
those already possessing generally greater trust in their fellow countrywomen and men (i.e. the
importance of having been born in Russia is a more significant driver of what national identity ‘is’
for those possessing greater trust in other Russians). When considering what it means to be Russian,
for those respondents who are generally more cautious having been born in Russia is a
comparatively less important component of national identity. Conceptually this makes sense- a
greater value is placed on having been born in Russia by those who generally self-identify as more
trusting of their fellow Russians, reflecting a tacit belief/assumption that it is easier to relate to and
work with those you presume to be more similar to yourself. For generally more cautious types,
simply having been born in Russia may be perceived as too low a bar or simply too arbitrary a
standard before tacitly presuming a greater degree of connection and trust in one’s countrymen.
After all, being born in Russia may make you a citizen, but it wouldn’t necessarily make you truly
Russian.
Notable differences between the two subgroups also exist in the dependent variable
indicators. More variation in the belief that democracies are not good at maintaining order is
explained by the aggregate democratic attitudes construct within the greater trust subgroup, while
the same group’s view of democracy accounts for comparatively less variation in the indicator
measuring the belief that democracies are indecisive and prone to squabbling. More generally
cautious respondents seem relatively less concerned with the general maintenance of order within
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society, but are more prone to being critical of democracy’s tendency towards squabbling and
indecisiveness.
Having found evidence suggesting a possible relationship between national identity and
attitudes towards democracy in the EVS data, one last effort was made with the ISSP data to see
if the issue of collinearity between the national identity constructs could be adequately modeled.
After all, though significant overlap between the subjective and ascriptive identity constructs exists
(0.86), a relationship between the IV and DV was also suggested. More interesting was the
suggested differences between the IV latents: as the importance of an ascriptive conception
increases, pride in democracy increases, whereas an increase in the subjective conception resulted
in pride in democracy decreasing (in turn suggesting that less trust is present).
To address the issue of collinearity (high correlation) between the differing conceptions of
national identity, the previous factor analyses were re-examined to identify potential issues with
model specification. Ultimately, a different approach was taken with the identified cross-loadings
which resulted in a significant improvement in model fit. Whereas a unique one-to-one relationship
between indicators and latents was imposed in the preliminary ISSP modeling efforts (i.e. an
indicator could only be associated with one latent or the other), the revised modeling efforts
incorporated this cross-loading into the revised structural model. Specifically the model was
adjusted so that the indicators measuring the importance of speaking Russian (v14) and the
importance of possessing Russian ancestry (v18) were influenced by each of the latent identity
constructs with 2-3 unique indicators remaining for each construct (Figure 32). Additionally, the
indictor measuring the importance of religiosity (i.e. Russian Orthodox) was removed.
The results suggest that the revised modeling efforts were warranted. The correlation
between the two national identity constructs was reduced (0.86 to 0.60), measures of model fit
improved slightly, and- more importantly- all indicator estimates achieved statistical significance.
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Substantively speaking a one standard deviation unit increase in ascriptive identity provides a 0.18
standardized increase in one’s pride in Russian democracy. This contrasts with the findings
suggesting that a one standardized unit increase in the subjective identity construct decreases one’s
pride in democracy by 0.11 standardized units.
The final steps of this research effort than repeated these re-modeling efforts for the 1995
and 2013 ISSP datasets with the model fit results reported in table 12 below. Joining the EVS
results, models associated with each of the three ISSP datasets achieved good fit with estimates
providing evidence that suggests a statistically significant relationship between one’s sense of
national identity and one’s attitudes towards democracy. The ISSP results distinguished
themselves from the EVS data by further suggesting that national identity is not a static or
monolithic concept, but rather an ever-evolving idea divisible into two differing- and sometimes
competing- conceptions of national identity that exists in the minds of Russian citizens.
Perhaps the most interesting product of these final efforts is the changing nature of which
identity conception influences pride in democracy over time. Whereas the 2003 data suggests that
both conceptions of national identity each have a statistically significant- yet distinctiverelationship with one’s attitude towards democracy, both the 1995 and 2013 data each suggest that
only conception relates to democratic attitudes and that which conception relates to the dependent
variable has shifted over time.
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V26- pride in democracy
How important is it toV11- have been born in Russia
V12- have Russian citizenship
V13- have lived in R for most of one’s life
V14- speak Russian
V16- respect R pol institutions/laws
V17- feel Russian
V18- have Russian ancestry

Figure 32: Re-revised ISSP 2003 SEM model (indicators removed; cross-loadings allowed)
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Table 25: Comparison of Model Fit Indices- revised models over time

Structural Model Chi-sq. DF

p

Chi-

RMR GFI AGFI CFI

RMSEA

sq./d.f.

1995

118.1

16

<.001

7.38

.034 .979 .953

.939

.069

2003

120.8

15

<.001

8.05

.020 .985 .964

.966

.060

2013

84.5

15

<.001

5.63

.017 .985 .963

.978

.058

The 1995 data reveals a statistically significant relationship between the subjective identity
construct which the ascriptive construct fails to match. A one standardized unit increase in the
perceived importance of subjectively oriented national identity (i.e. one’s perceptions of how
important it is to feel like a member of Russia and one’s respect for Russia’s laws and political
institutions) produces a 0.11 standardized unit increase in one’s pride towards how democracy
functions within Russia. Eight years later this statistically significant relationship was still present
but the directionality had been reversed. The same one unit change now produced a commensurate
0.11 unit decrease in one’s pride towards democracy, while increasing pride in democracy was
now reflected in increases of the ascriptive construct of identity (e.g. having been born, possessing
citizenship, and living most of one’s life in Russia), producing a 0.12 standardized unit increase in
in one’s democratic pride. By 2013 this subjective construct no longer held a statistically
significant relationship while the strength of the relationship between ascriptive identity and pride
in democracy had grown to 0.16.
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1995

2003

2013

Figure 33: Summary of Structural Model Results Over Time.
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Do these results make sense? They do seem to pass the prima facie sniff test. The 1995
data was collected only a few short years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is easy to imagine
one’s sense of pride in newfound political institutions tinged by the idealistic belief in its benefit
for all fellow Russians and driven by a respect for said institutions. By 2003 the effects of shock
therapy likely soured many on the purported egalitarian ideals of democracy (i.e. belief in the
benefits of a set of routinized practices among those within society who share similar fundamental
values). Idealism likely turned to cynicism as extraordinary hardships had been conferred upon
many while extraordinary wealth had been consolidated among few, in turn leading to increasing
mistrust of the governing political institutions and the democratic system they represented.
However conflict with- and victory over- Chechen separatists allowed for some sustained pride in
a still ill-defined in-group relative to the more clearly defined outgroup. By 2013 the economy had
stabilized due to high oil prices and Russia had formally changed the legal basis for Russian
citizenship. The former significantly improved the socio-economic circumstances of many
Russians (potentially helping to restore some sense of pride in the workings of the country’s
political institutions) while the latter influenced the evolving understanding of in-group
membership boundaries.
Speculative causal interpretation aside, models employing similar indicators used by two
different social survey groups, generated similar factor loadings (both in terms of association and
magnitude), while also suggesting which indicators contribute the greatest relative influence to
each of the constructed latent variables, solidify the belief in a relationship between national
identity and attitudes towards democracy.
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CONCLUSION

6.1

The Puzzle
Does the development of mass beliefs- such as a widely agreed upon sense of national

identity- influence a country’s prospects for democratization? Arguably yes. This research project
set out to empirically test the theoretical relationship between national identity and attitudes
towards democracy, as a way of furthering an understanding of Russia’s political developments
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such efforts are theoretically significant as they
contribute to both the conversations regarding the causal explanations of democracy and
democratization, as well as our discipline’s understanding of how amorphous concepts such as
national identity can be operationalized and utilized within social science research programs. In
considering the former, this scholarship effort was situated within political culture-oriented
explanations of democratic consolidation. While the boundary markers for national identity
scholarship are less readily identifiable, this effort contributed to the development of this subfield
with its modeling efforts involving existing large-N social survey data. While such dimensions
reflect a constructed inter-subjective basis of generalization, the fundamental units of analysis
ultimately reflect the psychology of individuals. Assuming that the masses matter in stories
involving democratic (or non-democratic) outcomes, then the evidence helps to support
Congruence Theory as the theoretical bridge between individual-level data and state-level
outcomes (i.e. democratic consolidation; Eckstein 1966, Welzel and Inglehart 1997).
Beyond its theoretical significance, increasingly questions addressing who ‘we’ are as a
politically relevant grouping of people are dominating societal discourses which seek to explain
the current state of increasingly turbulent political affairs. Increasing our understanding of what
national identity ‘is’ and how it (and its effects) manifests outwardly in terms of political behavior
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and attitudes is more important than ever. In practical terms, the more efforts are made to
understand the causes and consequences of national identity development, the better one is able to
understand the methods, motivations, and effects of elite efforts aimed at promulgating
nationalizing discourses.

6.2

The Findings
When the notion of a linkage between national identity and democratization was initially

expressed by Dankwart Rustow (1970), it was presented in the deterministic logic of necessary
and sufficient conditions which was methodologically fashionable in the 1960’s and 1970’s. This
effort approached its consideration of the question in a probabilistic fashion (Coppedge 2012, 5),
employing quantitative statistical techniques to assess whether evidence of a potential relationship
between two admittedly abstract concepts exists. In some ways this statistical approach itself was
a novel contribution as the majority of scholarship efforts dealing with the subject of national
identity are often case studies employing qualitative methodologies.
This statistical exploration of national identity began with chapter 3 which considered a
variety of descriptive statistics relating to the salient bases of group identification. The rationale
of this chapter was to provide a contextual understanding of relative in-group identifications within
Russia via a comparison of both primary and secondary data sources while also assessing the extent
to which trends in collective national consciousness could be readily identified. Such comparisons
were intended to allow for the primary data sources to serve as a preliminary ‘test’ of the results
reported in secondary sources. Results from this chapter were decidedly mixed. An evaluation of
the relative strength of association with one’s profession and citizenship suggests a pair of inverted
quadratic functions. Whereas profession starts low, gains in relative strength, than decreases in
relative importance, citizenship starts high, decreases for a period of time, before regaining the
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status as the most salient group identification. Compared to the clear juxtaposition of the relative
importance of citizenship and profession, results conveying the relative importance of ethnicity
and nationality were all over the place- likely due to differences in the category options provided
across different data sets- and suggested a greater degree of relative uncertainty as to the perceived
importance of these social categories.
When compared to these other bases of group membership, geography (specifically the
locality in which a respondent lives) was a relatively less important basis of collective identity.
However, when isolating and comparing different geographic groupings, there is an interesting
alternation between identification with locality and identification with the country as a whole.
Evidence from two different data sources suggest that while still important relative to other
geographic divisions, the overall strength of identification on the basis of locality seems to be
declining over time. By comparison, identification with the country as a whole was found to
decline within one source of data (ISSP) while increasing in another (EVS). While similar values
were found across both data sets, a consistent pattern over time was not. Ultimately it was possible
to identify some trends in the development of collective Russian national consciousness. Ingroup
identification on the basis of citizenship (and the degree of pride associated with said identification)
has consistently strengthened over time. So too has the outward devaluation of non-national
outgroups, namely immigrants, increasingly suggesting the emergence of a ‘closed’ belief system.
This evidence lends support to rejecting the null hypothesis that a shared sense of national
consciousness is neither identifiable nor present.
The difficulty in identifying trends in nationality (and ethnicity) simply on the basis of the
summary statistics presented in chapter 3, led to the more in-depth considerations of how to
measure and construct a testable model of national identity in chapter 4. This second analytical
chapter featured the use of factor analytic techniques to consider potential dimensions of national
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identity. Before assessing whether a relationship between national identity and democratization
exists, one must first have a operationalized construct with which to test. Thus the primary
objective of this chapter was to develop a construct of national identity for use in the subsequent
analytical chapter. Within the context of the three ISSP datasets, exploratory factor analysis
identified two distinctive yet correlated dimensions of national identity: ascriptive and subjective.
This evidence lends support to rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no discernable basis to an
agreed upon sense of collective national identity within Russia. Rather it seems that there is active
contestation occurring over time between two correlated- yet distinct- bases of Russian national
identity.
Whereas ascriptive components of collective national identity (e.g. having been born in
Russia, citizenship, having lived in Russia for most of one’s life) were initially more important
immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these arguably more inclusive
components gave way to a more subjective basis of shared identity over time. By 2013, ‘feeling
Russian’ had become the most significant individual indicator of national identity. Joined by
‘having Russian ancestry’ these two indicators helped shift the relative strength of identification
away from the ascriptive dimension to the subjective dimension. These preliminary trends in the
shifting nature of national identity over time led to the prediction that any relationship between
national identity and attitudes towards democracy would also shift over time.
The constructs developed in chapter 4 were then used to formally test this relationship in
chapter 5. Following confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling efforts
involving two different sources of data across four points in time, findings suggested the existence
of a statistically significant relationship between one’s sense of national identity and one’s attitudes
towards democracy. While the ISSP data produced more robust findings with respect to the
independent variable indicators, a more robust relationship with the dependent variable indicators
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was identified in the EVS data. Ultimately considerations of both series of data helped to avoid a
type 2 error (i.e. incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis). Furthermore the modeling efforts were
able to capture the distinctive effects of each of the national identity dimensions on democratic
attitudes. While both dimensions had a significant effect of comparable magnitude on the
dependent variable in 2003 (0.12 and -0.11 for ascriptive and subjective respectively), the
directionality of these impacts were at odds with each other. As the importance of the ascriptive
dimension increases, positive attitudes towards democracy also increased. However when the
subjective dimension grew in relative importance, favorable attitudes towards democracy would
decrease.
When evaluating the effects of these national identity dimensions over time, two interesting
results revealed themselves. First was the shift in which identity construct was found to associate
with the dependent variable/the democratic attitudes construct. In 1995, the subjective dimension
held a statistically significant relationship with democratic attitudes while the ascriptive dimension
did not. In 2003, both dimensions produced a statistically significant effect on attitudes towards
democracy though in opposite directions. By 2013, the dimensions (relative to 1995) were reversed
with the ascriptive dimension producing a significant effect on attitudes towards democracy. The
second interesting finding was the increasing strength of association between each of the factors
with one another over time. Beginning with the 1995 data and progressing through the 2013 data,
the correlation values between the two dimensions grew from 0.54 to 0.60 to 0.72. This suggests
that not only is there active contestation as to which of these identity dimensions truly captures the
essence of Russianness, but that the distinctiveness of these dimensions is becoming increasingly
murkier in the minds of Russian respondents.
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6.3

Limitations
While the findings of this research effort are interesting and potentially significant, said

effort is not lacking in some important qualifying limitations. First- and perhaps the most obviousis the standard critique of whether quantitative methodologies are even appropriate for considering
such subjective and abstract questions of national identity. Acknowledging that such modeling
efforts will never reflect a truly perfect ‘fit’ to an abstraction such as national identity, there is still
value to be gained from engaging in the efforts to model and formally operationalize existing
national identity data if for no other reason than to formally assess the arguable shortcomings in
said data and to avoid a tautological self-fulfilling prophecy, i.e. statistical modeling isn’t
legitimate because the data can never truly capture the essence of national identity; the data is
never good enough because no one employs it in statistical models to uncover the precise nature
of its shortcomings and recommendations for improving what information is collected.
Furthermore, the significance of the critique is lessened when research takes great pains to
acknowledge the valid prima facie concerns regarding concept validity in its methodological
approaches to the research. For example, the use of factor analytic techniques to bundle together
‘thin’ quantitative indicators in order to better identify the ‘thick’ underlying dimension of national
identity reflects a sensitivity to such concerns, as well as an adherence to the sort of prescriptions
set forth to address such concerns (Coppedge 2012). If efforts such as this still face a reflexive ‘it
might not be effectively capturing the underlying concept’, then at a certain point, the basis of
critique reflects a ‘no true scots-person’-style fallacy that no amount of research effort can
overcome.
More specific concerns include the consideration of missing data and the always present
specter of omitted variable bias. Responses to the key dependent variable indicators were missing
at a rate close to 20% leading this author to believe that MCAR (missing completely at random)
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could not be assumed. Additionally, the correlational strength between the identity dimensions
was not insignificant and at times problematic. While modeling efforts were able to generate
findings that have some generalizable value, future efforts will need to pay particular attention to
the identification and development of discrete identity constructs. Furthermore, given that
structural equation models are “models of causality that may or may not correspond to causal
sequences in the real world”, it is important to remember that causality is treated as an assumption
of SEM rather than a consequence (Kline 2005, 324). Therefore, using SEM allows one to assess
whether a hypothesized causal structure is- or is not- consistent with the data (McCoach, Black,
and O’Connell 2007). While there is value in assessing whether correlational structures match the
data as a prelude to more rigorous analysis of causation, the susceptibility of SEM to the problem
of omitted variable bias must be acknowledged (Tomarken and Waller 2005). Because the
disturbance terms effectively account for any omitted variables, they can “mask the limitations of
a rather incomplete model” (Tomarken and Waller 2005, 49). The potential effects of this include
the misrepresentation of the relationship among the variables, and biased parameter estimates.

6.4

Discussion
The evidence from this research suggests three important findings, specifically 1) the

existence of multiple, competing, inter-subjectively held conceptions of national identity existing
within Russia, which 2) vary over time, and 3) covary with inter-subjectively held beliefs towards
democracy across time. How do these findings contribute to our general understanding of mass
beliefs, and the particulars of national identity within Russia? What do these findings contribute
to our understanding of mass beliefs and democratic consolidation within Russia? And how do
these findings impact the way one thinks about democracy writ large?
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Broadly speaking these findings are generally consistent with the expectations that derive
from understandings of social identity theory (Tajfel 1978, Tajfel and Turner 1979, Hale 2004,
Clunan 2014). These findings are also consistent with those uncovered by Gibson and Duch (1993)
who similarly employed survey data and found evidence suggesting general attitudinal support for
democratic institutions but an absence of tolerance for political ‘others’. The gradual strengthening
of ingroup identification further suggests the growth of bonding social capital as well as a general
increase in exclusionary trust (Putnam 2000, Bahry et al 2005, Hammond and Axelrod 2006). In
this fashion, understandings of national identity reflect a kind of “social radar” which helps
individuals see where they stand in relation to their socially constructed human environment (Hale
2004, 463).
When considering the question of how these findings impact our understanding of national
identity as a general held mass-belief within Russia, while a measurable conception of national
identity is seemingly present within Russia, its nature is dynamic and changing over time. These
findings suggest additional support for Tolz (2001) that the dominant identity orientation in Russia
during the 1990’s reflected a more civic/voluntaristic (i.e. subjective) understanding of national
identity. However the evidence also suggests that this collective understanding has since shifted
in favor of a more ascriptive basis of understanding. This development is unlikely to change so
long as the Russian people continue to be broadly supportive of status quo ‘nationalizing state
policies’ (Brubaker 1996).
This also serves as evidence to support (in-part) the argument advanced by Brudny and
Finkel (2011). In their comparison of Russia and Ukraine, they argue explicitly that national
identity is the variable that best explains the differences in democratization between the two
countries. While their overarching causal argument is persuasive, their empirical evidentiary
support for said argument was noticeably lacking. The empirical support provided for their
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operationalization of national identity consisted of three sentences of opinion poll summation
across two paragraphs, involving analysis of arbitrarily selected indicators, and no explicit
empirical test of the broader relationship between national identity an democratization (2011, 285).
In general terms this research project provides a more robust empirical basis of evidentiary support
for the relationship between national identity and democratization. The analytical efforts of
Chapter 3 can be viewed as picking up where Brudny and Finkel (2011) leave off, thoroughly
extending on their initial empirical efforts to explore the constitutive basis of Russian national
identity. In doing so, this project strove to provide some of the evidentiary support for the idea
initially advanced by Rustow (1970), developed further by Linz and Stepan (1996), and formally
argued by Brudny and Finkel (2011).
While Russia is nominally a democracy, it is not a consolidated democracy 6. Given the
preceding consideration of national identity, it is worth considering- what is required for
consolidation? And what would it look like if it were? In general terms, a democracy is
consolidated when “a society frees itself from the spells cast by authoritarian demagogues and
rejects all alternatives to such democracy so as to no longer imagine any other possible regime”
(Hermet 1991, 257). More specifically, a consolidated democracy is “one in which none of the
major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is
any alternative to the democratic process to gain power, and that no political institutions or groups
has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers” (Linz 1990, 158). There
must be an authentic belief in democracy among both masses and elites, as opposed to merely
‘superfluous’ or ‘expedient’ participation (Mainwaring 1992).

6

See fn 4 in Chapter 2 on page 25.
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Russia currently finds itself in a phase where democratic mechanisms and procedures exist,
but neither a majority of the mass public nor the political elites seem principally committed to
Russia being more than a democracy in name only as evidenced by Putin’s ability to effectively
veto legitimate opposition with seemingly little impact upon his high public approval ratings and
periodic electoral validation. Indeed, one might contend that the problem is not an absence of
national identity, but rather the presence of two dueling conceptions of national identity. This in
turn suggests that it the mere presence of a cohesive sense of national identity is not enough to
sustain the possibility of democratic consolidation insofar as the mass attitudes of the people are
concerned. A more charitable- and potentially more accurate- characterization of the findings
would be that they lend support to alternative conceptions of what democracy “is” and how it is
fundamentally understood by the people of Russia. These findings reflect potential support for the
prominence of a statist conception of state-civil society relations within Russia, reflecting the tacit
support of the Russian people to see the primary purpose of democracy as reducing the risk of
anarchy at the expense of checks against tyranny (Hale 2002). These findings are consistent with
research supporting the notion that rather than interpreting Russian public opinion as being
generally supportive of autocracy, Russians differ from their western counterparts in their
purposive conceptualization of democracy as promoting stability- rather than individual liberty- at
a foundational level (Hale 2011).
What is required for mass attitudes to orient themselves towards democracy? Building
upon Rokeach’s typology of “open” and “closed” belief systems, Welzel and Inglehart (2007)
contend that what’s necessary is an open belief system reflecting social configurations that
alleviate (rather than exacerbate) existential pressures. If the prevailing psychological outlook of
a population is subject to significant existential pressures (e.g. precarious economic conditions,
conflated social cleavages, social polarization, etc.), people feel increased vulnerability and an
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increased desire for security and “protection under the shield of group cohesion” (2007, 300).
However if existential pressures are alleviated via social configurations that promote unity over
divisiveness, and a ‘we’re all in this together’ mentality, the perceived need for group-based
protection from the ‘others’ within one’s country is diminished and bridging social trust can
flourish. Whereas trust is something you have in others, national identity reflects the others you
have trust in.
Speaking of trust, what do these findings suggest in terms of our understanding of political
culture and democratic consolidation? One of the enduring questions within the subfield of
comparative politics is ‘what determines the emergence, survival, and development of democracy?’
(Welzel and Inglehart 2007, 297). Efforts contributing to answering this question broadly comprise
the study of democratization. Within this realm of study, causal explanations of democratization
have long been dominated by institutional/structural approaches (i.e. those considering the effect
of existing institutions and/or emphasizing socioeconomic requirements) and rational actor
approaches (i.e. those focusing on actions spurred by political elites). While both approaches have
their advantages, neither of them place significant (if any) emphasis on the role of mass attitudes.
Rather such emphasis is found within political culture approaches which serve as an important
compliment to the aforementioned approaches.
Political culture research is premised on the belief that answering ‘why democracy?’
requires some understanding of the mass beliefs held by the polity. This premise in turn depends
upon the assumption that mass beliefs are relevant in shaping the emergence, development, and
survival of democratic political structures- unless mass beliefs had some effect upon political
systems there would be no real point in analyzing them. While some scholars argue that the very
fate of democracy depends upon the people’ internalized commitment to democratic principles
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(Welzel and Inglehart 2007), others have disputed the extent to which such mass belief systems
actually impact political regimes.
In one well-regarded article broadly reviewing democratization literature (Shin 1994), the
role of mass beliefs is limited only to considerations of democratic consolidation. Characterizing
democratization as primarily elite-driven Shin (1994, 153) notes that “the literature does not
consider the commitment of the mass public to democracy an absolute requirement for democratic
transition. Indeed, it suggests that democracy can be created even when a majority of the citizenry
does not demand it.” Interestingly, the footnote and annotation accompanying that last sentence
includes the sole reference to Rustow (1970) which seems like a less-than-accurate
characterization of Rustow’s contribution to the history of democratization scholarship. Shin (1994,
154) thusly summarizes the role of the masses, “It is only in the consolidation of new democracies
that the mass public plays a key role.”
This general critique is supported and elaborated on by Coppedge (2012, 248-255). While
explicitly agreeing with the sentiment that elite involvement is necessary to facilitate democratic
transition and that the mass public plays only an indirect role in influencing or constraining the
actions of elites, Coppedge attempts to extend the potential implications of this critique even
further by calling in to question whether there is any relationship between political culture and the
survival of a democratic regime. Five enumerated claims are provided: that democratic institutions
can survive when opinion polls suggest low confidence in such institutions, it’s unclear whether
Robert Putnam’s proxy use of ‘participation in voluntary associations’ clearly promotes
cooperation and trust, that such participation does not directly impact regime change, that the
opinions of elites matter more, and that elites shape culture rather than the other way around. And
for good measure, Coppedge even also calls into question the potential relevance of trust relative
to other mass level attitudes.
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In first responding to the claims regarding political elites, yes, elites likely influence
political culture. That the causal influence works moreso in one direction does not singularly
invalidate the possibility that it can also work in the other direction. It also suggests the possibility
of a resolve via research design and/or methodological considerations to better distinguish between
the directionality of such effects. And yes, elites matter more when it comes to effectuating regime
change- no dispute here. Again, that observation does not invalidate the possibility of some
influence from the mass political culture; it merely suggests a greater influence from political elites.
While this (again) suggests a comparative lack of relative influence, it does not effectively indict
such a relationship nor suggest a lack of influence in an absolute sense. In regards to Putnam, such
observations at best invalidate the work of Putnam, rather than the entire subfield of political
culture. There is (again) the conflation with direct regime change vis a vis democratic transition as
opposed to the consideration of regimes that already possess some existing elements of democracy
while lacking others. Additionally, while I don’t doubt that criticisms of Putnam’s use of
‘participation in voluntary associations’ exist, neither the basis of such criticisms, nor the source
citations associated with such arguments were presented. And given the repeated argument that
the opinions of the masses likely bear no significant, direct influence on existing regime-level
institutions, it seems somewhat perplexing that the continuing existence of such institutions (not
surprising given research suggesting their ability to endure, e.g. Thelen 1999) would uniquely
serve to disprove any potential effects deriving from mass culture. Perhaps this observation lends
itself to the argument that institutions (like elites) matter more than political culture. But that is
not the same as proving the point that political culture is without relevance. Finally, when
considering the influence of trust as a specific attribute in relation to (or deriving from) these mass
beliefs, Coppedge is most persuasive when questioning the generalizability of how trust functions
across all cross-national contexts. However, Coppedge again seemingly conflates ‘not being the
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most important variable’ with being ‘a variable lacking in any importance’ while also not
accounting for research that contextualizes its relative importance at a micro-foundational level
(Carlin and Love 2013).
Welzel and Inglehart (2007) in turn offer a critique of the critique. Noting the “lingering
tendency to consider mass orientations as democracy consolidating, but not democracy inducing
has inhibited the political culture school”, they adopt a more expansive view and contend that
political culture studies can engage with the aspects of emergence and survival, not simply
development and consolidation (2007, 303). From this perspective, I tend to agree with their
conclusion that “a population’s prevailing psychological outlook is a selective force in the
emergence and survival of political regimes, helping to delegitimize incompatible regimes and
legitimize compatible ones.” (Welzel and Inglehart 2007, 299).Other scholars have argued that the
only effective way to understand the interplay between masses and political elites within the
context of democratization research is by way of an analysis of public attitudes and beliefs (Miller,
Reisinger, and Hesli 1993). Even if such limiting parameters (e.g. mass political culture only
matters when considering democratic consolidation) were true, there is still validity in deepening
our understanding of how permissive and/or exacerbating conditions, circumstances, and/or
variables are influenced and/or operate within the process of democratic consolidation. Even
Coppedge concedes the potential relevance for mass attitudes- especially within the context of
newer democracies- when citing agreement with Norris (1999, 268) that “it is hard to discount the
possibility that distrust in institutions could eventually metastasize to a rejection of democracy in
principle. Thus when regimes are not widely believed to be legitimate, then public opinion will
not act as an effective deterrent against anti-democratic forces.”
While this research admittedly does not offer a definitive resolve to these general tensions
within the discipline, its findings (and the author) lend support to the sentiment that mass beliefs
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matter and that political culture research can be analytically significant in ways beyond its current
general scope of application. While reasonable disagreement exists as to the exact extent of mass
beliefs’ impact upon democracy, circumstances such as those in Russia should leave no doubt that
mass attitudes are certainly a permissive circumstance that allows for backsliding, and is also
consistent with the general consensus within the discipline that the necessary evolution of political
culture required to support consolidation may take decades if not generations (Diamond 1992,
Putnam 1992). If true, this understanding could it turn provide an easy basis by which present and
future leaders my successfully exploit institutional weaknesses of existing democracies while
avoiding a forceful rebuke by the ultimate stakeholders within said democracy.

6.5

Implications
It has been noted that there exists a general need to overcome the perceived divisions

between- and research approaches associated with- thick and thin concepts that exist within
comparative politics generally, and approaches to democratization research more specifically
(Coppedge 2012). Following the prescriptive advice of Coppedge that such divisions can be
overcome “by developing quantitative indicators of thick concepts” (2012, 45), these findings
reflect the successful creation of an empirical model of something approximating ‘thick’
conceptions of national identity within Russia. Such a model was achieved by an aggregation of
‘thin’ quantitative indicators. Individually, each of these indicators would serve as a poor
approximation of the underlying concept of national identity. Bundled together via factor analytic
techniques, they more robustly suggest the presence of underlying dimensions reflective of
changing conceptions of national identity over time.
These findings also suggest the existence of empirical support for the hypothesized
relationship between national identity and democratization. Broadly speaking, these findings
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suggest that Rustow was right…sort of. While not as deterministic of a relationship as Rustow
originally articulated, evidence supports the existence of a quantifiable relationship between a
generally agreed upon basis of national identity and how people view the relative benefits of
democracy. While these findings do not provide evidence of a direct causal relationship between
mass-level and institutional level phenomenon, they arguably serves as an indirect basis of support
for Eckstein’s Congruency Theory (1966) as a theoretical linkage or bridge between the
aforementioned ‘selective force’ of psychological mass tendencies and systemic institutional
properties. Specifically, this suggests a relationship between how people understand the contours
of their national basis of group membership and their thoughts regarding the overall effectiveness
and desirability of a democratic system. Moreover, the findings also suggest variation in this
relationship, i.e. how national identity is understood affects how democracy is perceived.
This makes sense as the notion of democracy as a political system ‘by the people, for the
people’ requires knowing who ‘the people’ are. Thus national identity is inextricably linked to
considerations of democracy as questions of national identity seek to answer ‘who are we’?
(Huntington 2004). While it might be possible to achieve a preliminary transition to democracy –
as Russia did- without first resolving this question, both the extant literature and these findings
suggest that subsequent consolidation of democracy is difficult if not outright impossible.
When coupled with the prevailing sentiments regarding the important role that political
elites serve in influencing mass attitudes towards both national identity and democracy, then these
findings illustrate the potential for political elites to actively appeal to a people’s sense of national
identity, given the understanding that such politically relevant group identity can serve as a
cornerstone of commonality on which to base one’s appeals in active pursuit of one’s political
goals. Leaders principally committed to democracy could influence mass attitudes to facilitate a
greater sense of openness within the belief system of a population, thus increasing the likelihood
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for consolidation. However this requires a principled commitment to democracy- or at least a
commitment greater than one’s self-interest in preserving political power. Unfortunately, this also
highlights the potential for exploitation by illiberal leaders appealing to- and thus effectively
reinforcing- divisions within society. If democratic institutions are weak, or if democratic norms
have not been internalized within a country’s political culture, then calling in to question who
should appropriately be considered members of ‘the people’ is an excellent means of reducing
cooperation and trust within society. Indeed it has been noted that the more vocal or explicit the
appeal to country’s sense of identity, the more wary one should be- historically it has been
nationalists least secure in their sense of national identity which have exhibited the greatest
potential for engagement in outward conflict with others (Rustow 1970, Schafer 1999). This can
be particularly problematic when exogenous economic circumstances worsen, increasing the
susceptibility of majority groups to scapegoat minority groups within society.
Such real-world implications not only provide additional avenues for further testing within
comparative politics, but also extend beyond the discipline’s subfield boundaries. While this effort
was dedicated to the consideration of national identity’s effect on a country’s prospects for
democratization, IR scholars have similarly considered how political elites use identity
management techniques to help shape foreign policy efforts (Hopf 1998, Clunan 2014).

6.6

Suggestions for Future Research
While this effort served an important role in formally modeling national identity and testing

the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy, it is an admittedly
small step towards addressing the larger puzzle of national identity’s relationship with democratic
consolidation writ large. When considering likely primary causal influences, the role of political
elites- specifically their ability to influence not only mass-level conceptions of national identity,
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but also as the actors with the greatest ability to directly initiate changes to the institutional
workings of democracy at the institutional regime level- was assumed for the purposes of this
project. Rather than assuming the influence of political elites, future research efforts should more
robustly examine the role/ability/effect of political elites on such mass-level attitudes as national
identity.
Subsequent research efforts should also assess the generalizability of these preliminary
findings by applying these modeling techniques to other country cases. The logical next step would
be an examination of other former Soviet states such as Ukraine and Belarus, which would
hopefully continue to uncover empirical support for highly persuasive, well-developed arguments
otherwise lacking in robust evidentiary support (Brudny and Finkel 2011). Once attention shifts
towards cross-national comparability close attention would be paid to reconciling recent
discussions and developments regarding the appropriate methodological basis of comparability
across said contexts (Aleman and Woods 2016, Welzel and Inglehart 2016).
Additionally, this effort revealed some shortcomings with existing survey collections as it relates
to this particular research question. Future surveys would ideally include a multitude of indicators
for both national identity and democratic attitudes. Long term, it will be worthwhile to figure out
the boundaries of acceptable generalization for these findings a la Bunce (2000), by
operationalizing and testing this relationship in different regional contexts beyond the post-Soviet
context.
Finally it is worth repeating that while this author sees unique value in the political cultural
tradition of exploring and explaining democratization, this in no way implies that efforts grounded
within this approach are superior to those deriving from other research traditions. In essence, these
findings effectively provide the evidentiary support for ideas developed from within the
aforementioned traditions. This reflects the belief that no one camp can explain the totality of
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democratization. Rather these findings should be seen as complementary to the excellent
theoretical contributions driving from these alternate traditions. Indeed future research should
consider the interplay of these distinctive explanations. For example, how might institutions serve
as an important check against political elites making anti-democratic appeals on the basis of
national identity? Analogous to the way that national identity approximates a daily plebiscite
(Renan 1882), democratic institutions similarly require periodic affirmation by the people. When
‘the people’ can affirm who they are (and are not) while also valuing the workings of democracy
as an intrinsic good, then the types of democracy we know and love can continue to emerge,
survive, and thrive.
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APPENDIX A. ISSP SURVEY INFORMATION

ISSP Series Description
Series name
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
Series information
The ISSP is a cross-national collaboration programme, which has been continuously
conducting annual surveys on diverse social science topics since 1985. The topics for
each ISSP survey are proposed by delegates from ISSP member countries. Then, a Basic
Questionnaire is composed and improved over several years by a committee, elected by the
General Assembly before it is pretested in various countries. Starting in 1984 with four
founding nations - Australia, Germany, Great Britain and the United States, the ISSP
meanwhile has grown up to almost 50 member countries covering various cultures around
the globe.
ISSP Modules 1985 – 2015:
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐

Citizenship: 2004/ 2014
Environment: 1993/ 2000/ 2010
Family and Changing Gender Roles: 1988/ 1994/ 2002/ 2012
Health and Health Care: 2011
Leisure Time and Sports: 2007
National Identity: 1995/ 2003/ 2013
Religion: 1991/ 1998/ 2008
Role of Government: 1985/ 1990/ 1996/ 2006
Social Inequality: 1987/ 1992/ 1999/ 2009
Social Networks: 1986/ 2001 (Social Relations and Support Systems)
Work Orientations: 1989/ 1997/ 2005/ 2015

Study Description – National Identity II - ISSP 2003

Authoring Entity/ Principal Investigators
<large table removed>
Bibliographic citation
Publications based on ISSP data, which are made available through GESIS, should
acknowledge those sources by means of bibliographic citations. To ensure that such
source attributions are captured for social science bibliographic utilities, citations should
appear in footnotes or in the reference section of publications.
How to cite the data: ISSP Research Group (2012): International Social Survey
Programme: National Identity II - ISSP 2003. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3910
Data file Version 2.1.0, doi: 10.4232/1.11449
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Abstract
Questions on national consciousness and national identity.
Topic classification
Topics: Identification with the town, the city, the region, the nation and with the respective
continent; most important characteristics for national identity; identification with one´s
own nation and national pride (scale); perceived pride in the democracy of the country, the
political influence of the country in the world, the economic achievement, the social
security system, the scientific achievements, the achievements in sports, the achievements
in arts or literature, the armed forces, the history and equal rights of all social groups in
society; preference for protective duty to support the national economy; attitude to the
right of international institutions to enforce solutions to be accepted nationally; attitude to
enforcing national interests regardless of evoking conflicts with other countries; rejection
of acquisition of land by foreigners in one´s country; reference for national films in
national television stations; damage done by large international companies to the local
business; attitude to free trade; attitude to follow the decisions of international
organisations even if the local government does not agree with them; international
organisations take away too much power from the country; availability of worldwide
information as a benefit of the internet; importance of sharing national customs and
traditions to achieve full nationality; attitude to government support of national minorities
to preserve their customs and habits; preference for assimilation of minorities or retention
of their identity; hostility to foreigners and prejudices against immigrants (scale); attitude
to a reduction of immigration of foreigners; respondents citizenship; citizenship of parents
at birth of respondent; birthplace or citizenship of parents should allow naturalization of
children; same rights for citizens and legal immigrants; attitude towards stronger
measures regarding illegal immigrants; languages spoken at home; perceived ethnic
affiliation and strength of this feeling.
Universe
18 years old (exclusions: Finland: 15; Japan, Netherlands, Russia and South Africa: 16; Sweden:
17) and older
Selection method
Sampling procedures differ for the individual countries: Partly simple, partly multi-stage
stratified random sample
Fieldwork and sample sizes
Table: Countries (regions) and fieldwork information for ISSP 2003
Russia

RU

Jul 03

Levada-Center, Russia

RU03

2383

Mode of data collection
Oral, paper and pencil respectively postal interview with standardised questionnaire
Corresponding survey material
When dealing with international comparative data, data sets and documentation must be
seen as two sides of the same coin. Even though ISSP members make huge efforts to
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produce comparable data in each country, there still remains a remarkable amount of
country specific peculiarities in the contributions to the final, international data set.
These country specific peculiarities either have to be harmonised or to be documented,
as they provide vital information for secondary analysts.
National Study Description
For each country, the original National Study Description is available in the appendix of
this Variable Report. The National Study Descriptions are provided by the countries and
include information on sample sizes, field dates, modes of data collection, sampling
procedures, response rates and weighting processes.
Characteristics of National Population
The appendix of this Variable Report also includes Characteristics of National
Populations for all participating countries from 1989 on. These documents provide
statistical data on the composition of national populations in terms of gender, age,
education and employment rates and, therefore, allow assessing how representative
national samples are.
Where to find the survey materials and the data set of the ISSP Module of
2003 – National Identity II
In the GESIS Data Catalogue on the GESIS web you find
the Basic Questionnaire of this module together with
all country questionnaires in the respective local languages,
the Codebook (Variable Report) with the National Study Descriptions and the
Characteristics of National Populations in its appendix
the Study Monitoring Report and
the integrated data file ZA3910_v2.1.0
for download under the tab “Data and Documents” of:
http://info1.gesis.org/dbksearch19/SDesc2.asp?no=3910

The GESIS online data portal ZACAT also provides the integrated data file and further
ISSP documentation materials for download:
http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fStudy/ZA3910
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Study Description:

Russia

Study title:
Fieldwork dates:
Principal investigators:
Sample type:

‘ISSP-2003 Module “National Identity II”
July,01.-15,2003
L. Khakhulina, Levada-Center
Description of the sampling procedure

Stratification procedure. Nationwide sample (N=2100) was divided among:
10 large economic-geographical macro regions proportionate to the size of the local population aged
16+ of each macro region
5 strata of rural districts and urban settlements* in each of 10 macro regions proportionate to the size of
the local population aged 16+ of each stratum.
*1) less than 10,000; (rural districts & small urban settlements)
2) from 10,000 – to100,000;
3) from 100,000 – to 500,000;
4) from 500,000 – to 750,000;
5) over 750,000 inhabitants
Selection primary sampling units (PSUs). All cities over 500, 000 inhabitants were included in the
sample as self-representative units. Urban and rural settlements were considered as primary sample units
(PSUs). In each stratum (except strata of cities over 500,000 and 2 capital cities) the number of PSUs was
calculated on the limitation of 15 interviews per PSU and the PSUs as well were selected with the
probability to its sizes (the number of its inhabitants). The total numbers of interviews accounted for a
stratum was distributed approximately equally among selected PSUs. Totally 101 PSUs were selected.
Selection of secondary sampling points (SSUs). Electoral districts were used as secondary sampling
points In the cities over 500,000 inhabitants the number of surveyed SSUs was defined by condition of 7
interviews per SSU. In the rest of selected PSU two sampling points were randomly selected from the
list of all electoral districts of this PSU.
Totally 240 sample points were selected.
Selection of households. The households were selected by a random route method. If a household or a
respondent refused to participate in the survey or not been achieved for 4 visits an interviewer should
visit the next address from the rout in the selected districts.
Selection of respondents. Within a household a member with the nearest birthday was selected for
interviewing. In order to reach a selected respondent an interviewer visited each address up to 3 times in
different days of a week and at different time of a day.
The following categories were excluded from the gross sample:
a) persons doing their military service by draft (about 1%)
b) persons under imprisonment (about 0,8%)
c) population of the areas under the war conflict in North Caucasus (1,9%)
d) population of remote or difficult to access regions of Far North (0,9)
e) rural localities with less then 50 inhabitants (0,8%)
Levada-Center
Fieldwork institute:
Fieldwork methods:
Self-completion
Sample size:
N=2400 (2100 + 300 extra sample in Moscow)
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Response rates:

Language:
Weighted:
Weighting procedure:

5902
182
5720
2408
3367
1653
1328
331

A - Total issued (total sample)
B - Ineligible (address vacant, wrong ages,...)
C - (= A - B) Total eligible (in scope sample)
D - Total ISSP questionnaires received
E - (= C - D; = F + G + H) Total non-response
F - Refusals (refusing to take part)
G - Non-contact (never contacted)
H - Other non-response

Russian
yes, a weighting factor exists in the data set
exact description of the weighting procedure / algorithm

Main principles of weighting procedure
The total expected number N of respondents for a certain region being treated equal
N = N0 * P ,
where N0 denotes the size of total sample, P - the share of the region population
in the entire population.
As a result of correction, every respondent X [k] has the definite weight W[k], within the limits
0 < W[ k] < ~10 , so that the following conditions were valid :
1) the value of sum(W[k]) for the region concerned was equal to N
2) for every controlled group G[i] the value Q[i] being equal to Q[i] = sum( W[k] |
X[k].belong to
G[i] ) / N, was closed to a proportion P[i] of group G[i] in the region population
i.e. Q[i] ~ P[i], i=1,2,...,16.
The value of J being equal to J = sum( (Q[i]-P[i])**2 ) + (sum(W[k])/N - 1)**2 , was used
as the criterion for minimization on the weights` sets variety.
Quality of corrections
male fem
<25
<40
<55
>54
H
S
P
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Survey:
3785 6214 1590 2490 2549 3370 2553 5371 2075
Weighted :
4578 5421 1719 2709 2761 2810 1541 5444 3014
Statistics:
State
4579 5420 1718 2710 2762 2809 1542 5444 3013
*1-2 –sex
3-6 –age
7-9 – education (higher, secondary, primary)
Weights coefficients sum is equal 2107 .
Mean values: ZERO 0 -.1 .1- .2 .2 - .5 .5- 1 1-2 2- 5 5-10 >10
Number:
0
0
291 1021 489 330 266 12
0
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ISSP Characteristics of National Population (Russia)
Source: the data of the State Statistics Committee of Russia, 2000
Source no. 1
SEX
Male
Female

45,57
54,43

AGE (groups)
18-24
25-39
49-54
55+

13,53
28,12
28,90
29,45

YEARS OF SCHOOLING (groups)*
Higher
Secondary
Incomplete secondary

16,28
55,80
27,92

EMPLOYMENT STATUS (1.02.04)**
Employed
Unemployed
Not in labor force

58.6
9.5
31.9

Source – Census, 2002 , Russian State Statistical Committee (Rosstat).
*) Data of years of education are not available.
**) Social and economic situation in Russia. Rosstat. 2004.
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APPENDIX B. ISSP QUESTIONNAIRE- 2003 MODULE

Q. 1. We are all part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we
think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing
1, 2
who you are? And the second most important? And the third most important?
Please tick one box in each column
Most
Important
Your current or previous occupation (or being a homemaker).
Your race/ethnic background.
Your gender (that is, being a man/woman).
Your age group (that is, Young, Middle Age, Old).
Your religion (or being agnostic or atheist).
Your preferred political party, group, or movement.
Your nationality.
Your family or marital status (that is, son/daughter,
mother/father, grandfather/grandmother, husband/wife,
widower/widow, not married, or other similar)
Your social class (that is upper, middle, lower,
working, or similar categories)
The part of [COUNTRY] that you live in

Second Most
Important

Third Most
Important

D
D
D
D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D
D
D
D

D

D

D

D
D

D
D

D
D

Q. 2. How close do you feel to... (Please, tick one box on each line)

Very close
a) Your town or city
b) Your [county]
c) [COUNTRY]
d) [Continent; e.g. Europe]

D
D
D
D

Close

Not very close

D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D

Not close at all
D
D
D
D

Can’t choose
D
D
D
D

[2. Precode: “Feel close to” is to be understood as “emotionally attached to” or “identifying with”.
2b) [county] (or province, state, etc.): to be understood as the most relevant administrative unit smaller
than the entire country/nation.
2d) [Europe]: give relevant continent or subcontinent: Europe, North America, East Asia/Southeast Asia]

1 In oral interviews, use card with choices
2

This question was not asked in the 1995 or 2013 modules.
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Q. 3. Some people say that the following things are important for being truly
[NATIONALITY]3. Others say they are not important. How important do you think
each of the following is... (Please, tick one box on each line)
Very
important

Fairly
important

Not very
important

Not important
at all

Can’t
choose

a. to have been born
in [COUNTRY]

D

D

D

D

D

b. to have [COUNTRY
NATIONALITY] citizenship

D

D

D

D

D

c. to have lived in [COUNTRY]
for most of one’s life

D

D

D

D

D

d. to be able to speak
[COUNTRY LANGUAGE]

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

institutions and laws
g. to feel
[COUNTRY
NATIONALITY]
h. to have [COUNTRY

D

D

D

D

D

NATIONALITY] ancestry4

D

D

D

D

D

e. to be a [religion]
f. to respect [COUNTRY
NATIONALITY] political

[3. Precode “truly [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]” E.g. “truly British”, American “a
true American”.
3d) [dominant language(s)] If two or more languages are recognized nationwide both are
included in the question. However, if there is one national lingua franca (Spanish,
Russian) just give this language.
3e) The dominant religion or denomination in your country should be given (eg. Christian
in the US and Canada, Catholic in Ireland and Italy, Russian Orthodox in Russia)].

3
4

Insert nationality corresponding to COUNTRY.
This question was not asked in the 1995 module.
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Q. 4. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please,
tick one box on each line)
Neither
agree nor

Agree

Disagree Can’t

strongly Agree disagree

Disagree strongly choose

a. I would rather be a citizen of
[COUNTRY] than of any other country

D

D

D

D

D

D

in the world
b. There are some things about
[COUNTRY] today that make me feel

D

D

D

D

D

D

ashamed of [COUNTRY]
c. The world would be a better place if
people from other countries were more

D

D

D

D

D

D

like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]
d. Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a
better country than most other

D

D

D

D

D

D

countries
e. People should support their country
even if the country is in the wrong.

D

D

D

D

D

D

f. When my country does well in
international sports, it makes me proud

D

D

D

D

D

D

to be [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]
g. I am often less proud of
[COUNTRY] than I would like to be.

D

D

D

D

D

D

Q. 5. How proud are you of [COUNTRY] in each of the following? (Please, tick
one box on each line)
Very
proud

Somewhat
proud

Not very
proud

Not proud
at all

Can’t
choose

a. the way democracy works
b. its political influence in the world
c. [COUNTRY’s] economic achievements
d. its social security system
e. its scientific and
technological achievements

D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D

D

D

D

D

D

f. its achievements in sports
g. its achievements in the arts and literature
h. [COUNTRY’S] armed forces
i. its history
j. its fair and equal treatment of all
groups in society

D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D

D
D
D
D

D

D

D

D

D
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Q. 16. How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]? (Please, tick one box on each line)
Very proud
Somewhat proud
Not very proud
Not proud at all
I am not [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]
Can’t choose

D
D
D
D
D
D
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APPENDIX C. EUROPEAN VALUES SURVEY INFORMATION

1

European Values Study 1981-2008

The European Values Study is the most comprehensive research project on human values in Europe. It is a large-scale, crossnational, and longitudinal survey research program on how Europeans think about family, work, religion, politics and society.
Repeated every nine years in an increasing number of countries, the survey provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences,
attitudes, values, and opinions of citizens all over Europe.
The research program was initiated by the European Value System Study Group (EVSSG) in the late 1970s and has emerged as
a well-established network of social and political scientists aiming at high standards in data creation and processing. From 1981
to 2008 four waves of survey were conducted in European and other countries. These surveys explore value differences,
similarities, and value changes among citizens of the EVS member countries.
Survey 2008
The fourth wave has a persistent focus on a broad range of values. Questions with respect to family, work, religious, political
and societal values are highly comparable with those in earlier waves (1981, 1990 and 1999). This longitudinal scope of the
study makes it possible to study trends in time. The EVS has an increasing international and regional coverage. In 2008 it covers
47 countries/regions of Europe. Table 1 gives an overview of countries participating in EVS waves and year of fieldwork.

2

Access to data and documentation

General study information
The EVS website (www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu) covers comprehensive information on the origin of the project and provides
access to all data and documentation available for EVS surveys.
Data and documentation download
Data and documentation can be obtained at the GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences in Cologne through their online
download facilities GESIS Data

Catalogue

(http://gesis.org/data- catalogue/) and ZACAT-Online Study Catalogue

(http://zacat.gesis.org/).

GESIS Data Catalogue: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0009&DB=E
ZACAT: http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5

Study Description
Study description included in the GESIS Data Catalogue gives information about the origin of the data, as well as data releases,
errors detected between data releases, and error corrections..

2.1 Bibliographic citation
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Publications based on EVS data should acknowledge this by means of bibliographic citations. To ensure that such source
attributions are captured for social science bibliographic utilities, citations must appear in the footnotes or in the reference
section of publications.
How to cite the data
EVS (2010): European Values Study 2008 - Russian Federation. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4777 Data File Version
1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.10170.
How to cite this publication
EVS, GESIS (2013): European Values Study 2008 - Variable Report Russian Federation. GESIS- Variable Report 2013/70.
Principal investigators

-

Bashkirova, Elena, Bashkirova & Partners, Russian Federation

Data collector
-

Bashkirova and partners, Moscow

2.2 Study scope
Abstract
Moral, religious, societal, political, work, and family values of Europeans.

Topics
1. Perceptions of life: …
.
.
5..Politics and society: political interest; political participation; preference for individual freedom or social equality; selfassessment on a left-right continuum (10-point-scale); self-responsibility or gov- ernmental provision; free decision of jobtaking of the unemployed or no permission to refuse a job; advantage or harmfulness of competition; liberty of firms or
governmental control; equal incomes or incentives for individual efforts; attitude concerning capitalism versus government
ownership; post- materialism (scale); expectation of future development (less emphasis on money and material posses- sions,
greater respect for authority); trust in institutions; satisfaction with democracy; assessment of the political system of the
country as good or bad (10-point-scale); preferred type of political system (strong leader, expert decisions, army should rule
the country, or democracy); attitude towards democracy (scale).
.
.
7. National identity: geographical group the respondent feels belonging to (town, region of country, country, Europe, the
world); citizenship; national pride; fears associated with the European Union (the lossof social security and national identity,
growing expenditure of the own country, the lossof pow- er in the world for one´s own country and the lossof jobs); attitude
towards the enlargement of the European Union (10-point-scale); voting intensions in the next election and party preference;
partythat appeals most; preferred immigrant policy; opinion on terrorism; attitude towards immigrants and their customs and
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traditions (take jobs away, undermine a country´s cultural life, make crime problems worse, strain on country´s welfare system,
threat to society, maintain distinct customs and traditions); feeling like a stranger in one´s own country; too many
immigrants; important aspects of national identity (being born in the country, to respect country´s political institutions and
laws, to have coun- try´s ancestry, to speak the national language, to have lived for a long time in the country); interest in
politics in the media; give authorities information to help justice versus stick to own affairs; closeness to family,
neighbourhood, the people in the region, countrymen, Europeans and mankind; concerned about the living conditions of
elderly people, unemployed, immigrants and sick or disabled people.
.
.
Interviewer rating: respondent´s interest in the interview.
Additionally encoded: interviewer number; date of the interview; total length of the interview; time of the interview (start
hour and start minute, end hour and end minute); language in which the interview was conducted.
Additional country specific variables are included in this national dataset.
Universe
Persons18 yearsor older who are resident within private households, regardless of nationality and citizenship or language.

2.3 Methodology and processing
Selection method
A representative multi-stage or stratified random sample was used in EVS member countries.
For more country-specific information about the sampling procedure, please go to the EVS website
http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/surveys/survey-2008/participatingcountries/ and see the method reports provided for
all participating countries.
Modeof data collection
Face- to-face interviews with standardized questionnaire PAPI (Paper)
Fieldwork was conducted on the basis of detailed and uniform instructions prepared by the EVS advi- sory groups. The English
basic questionnaire was translated into other languages by means of the questionnaire translation system WebTrans, a webbased translation platform designed by Gallup Europe. The whole translation processwas closely monitored and quasiautomated documented.
Number of units: 1504

Number of variables: 441
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APPENDIX D. EUROPEAN VALUES SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Hello. I am from the [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]. We are carrying out the [NATION] part of a Europeanwide study on what people value in life. This study will interview samples representing the European people.
Your name has been selected at random as part of a representative sample of the [NATION] public. I’d like to
ask your views on a number of different subjects. Your help will contribute to a better understanding of what
people all over Europe believe and want out of life.

SHOW CARD 6 – CODE AN ANSWER FOR EACH
Q6

On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to
have as neighbours?

v46 A People with a criminal record
v47 B People of a different race
v48 C Left wing extremists
v49 D Heavy drinkers
v50 E Right wing extremists
v51 F People with large families
v52 G Emotionally unstable people
v53 H Muslims
v54 I Immigrants/foreign workers
v55 J People who have AIDS
v56 K Drug addicts
v57 L Homosexuals
v58 M Jews
v59 N Gypsies
v60 O Christians
Q7

mentioned

not mentioned

DK

NA

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?
1 – most people can be trusted (v62)
2 – can’t be too careful
8 – don’t know
(spontaneous)
9 – no answer
(spontaneous)
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SHOW CARD 64
Q64 On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all
satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?
1 – very satisfied (v223)
2 – rather satisfied
3 – not very satisfied
4 – not at all satisfied
8 – don’t know (spontaneous)
9 – no answer (spontaneous)
Q66 I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a
way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly
bad or very bad way of governing this country?
very
fairly
fairly
very
DK NA
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother
with parliament and elections

1

2

3

4

8

9

V226 Having experts, not government, make decisions

1

2

3

4

8

9

v227 Having the army rule the country

1

2

3

4

8

9

v228 Having a democratic political system

1

2

3

4

8

9

v225

according to what they think is best for the country

SHOW CARD 67 – READ OUT AND CODE ONE ANSWER PER
Q67

v229
v230

I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system.
Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read
each of them?
agree
disagree
agree
disagree
DK
NA
strongly
strongly
Democracy may have problems but
it’s better than any other form of
government
In democracy, the economic system

1

2

3

4

8

9

1

2

3

4

8

9

v231

Democracies are indecisive and have
too much squabbling

1

2

3

4

8

9

v232

Democracies aren’t good at

1

2

3

4

8

9
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SHOW CARD 69 – CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY FOR Q69
Q69

Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?

STILL USE CARD 69 – CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY FOR Q70
Q70

And secondly?
Q69 (v253)

Q70 (v254)

First

DK

NA

Second

DK

NA

A locality or town where you live

1

8

9

1

8

9

B region of country where you live

2

8

9

2

8

9

C [COUNTRY]

3

8

9

3

8

9

D Europe

4

8

9

4

8

9

E the world as a whole

5

8

9

5

8

9

Q71 Are you a citizen of [COUNTRY]?
1 – yes (v255)
2 – no ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > GO TO Q73
8 – don’t know (spontaneous) ------------------------------------------------------ > GO TO Q73
9 – no answer (spontaneous) -------------------------------------------------------- > GO TO Q73

Q72

How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen?
1 – very proud (v256)
2 – quite proud
3 – not very proud
4 – not at all proud
7 – not applicable (spontaneous)
8 – don’t know
(spontaneous)
9 – no answer
(spontaneous)
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APPENDIX E. SECONDARY RUSSIAN DATA SOURCES

Contemporary Russian Identity: Measurements, Challenges, Answers.

The Russian Public Opinion Research Center conducted a poll commissioned by the Valdai
Discussion Club, “Contemporary Russian Identity: Measurements, Challenges, Answers,” ahead
of its tenth anniversary meeting “Russia’s Diversity for the Modern World” to feed the discussion
at the conference.

This research poll analyses five basic valuable aspects of contemporary Russian identity. In
particular, the respondents were proposed to reflect over following principal aspects: culture,
religion, ethnicity, self-identification, patriotism etc.

The survey integrated the respondents presented by men and women between the ages of 28 and
42, at least 50% of them active internet users, politically active (willing to attend rallies for their
rights, protests against declining living standards, etc.). The pool took place in Moscow,
Kaliningrad, Yekaterinburg and Makhachkala. Nationwide representative quantitative poll was
presented by 1,600 Russian respondents over 18 years old in 45 regions, 137 cities and towns.

The results (both in English and Russian) are accessible at-

http://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/contemporary_russian_identity_measurements_challenges_answers/
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Twenty Years of Reforms through the Eyes of Russians

The original file (in Russian) is accessible athttp://www.isras.ru/files/File/Doklad/20_years_reform.pdf

Translated excerpts from the Foreword (reflecting methodological considerations) and chapter 12
are included below. Translation achieved via Google Translate.

In order to identify Russians' perception of the experience of reforming the economic,
social and political life of society over the past twenty years, the changes that took place in the
society over these years, in April 2011, the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of
Sciences conducted an all-Russian sociological study: "Twenty years of reforms through the eyes
of Russians ". A representative sample in all the territorial and economic regions of the country,
as well as in Moscow and St. Petersburg, polled 1,750 respondents aged 18 and over, representing
11 social groups: workers, mines and construction sites; engineering and technical intelligentsia;
humanitarian intelligentsia (scientists, university professors, teachers of schools, colleges);
employees of trade, consumer services, transport and communications; employees; entrepreneurs
of small and medium business; servicemen and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
inhabitants of villages and villages; city pensioners; university students; unemployed. The study
was conducted in 58 settlements, in proportion to the population of megacities, regional centers,
district cities and villages.
At the same time, the empirical basis of this study was the results of a study carried out by
the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2001. "New Russia: Ten Years
of Reforms." Since the studies were carried out on the same sample model using a number of
similar issues (indicators), this report was able to carry out a comparative analysis that reveals not
only the current state of mass consciousness but also its development trends, the features of
manifestation at various stages of reform. We are talking about two periods in the life of the
country: the 90's, and 2000's.

12. Russian identity and interethnic relations
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Russian citizens live in a state whose image was completely different for most of them 20
years ago. Not only its spatial outlines "from the southern mountains to the northern seas" have
changed, but also the system of relations, the ethnic composition of the population, the state
structure. And since these changes coincided with economic difficulties, loss of confidence in life,
adversity, even in one area, united in the representation of people with others and caused in many
an inescapable longing for the past: "how well we lived badly."
In the early years of the new Russia, many people still felt "Citizens of the USSR." In 1992,
71% of respondents identified themselves as a citizen of Russia53. Now, twenty years later, when
determining their identity, 95% of respondents in the country to some extent perceive themselves
as "citizens of Russia", of which 72% feel their community with Russian citizens "to a large
extent." Judging by the survey results, this is the strongest, most confident identity among the other
most significant identities (Figure 12.1).

Figure 12.1. With whom people feel a connection to a large extent,%

With Russian citizens 72
With fellow countrymen 60
With people of the same views on life 52
With people of the same nationality 51
With people of the same faith 42
With people of the same profession 40
The Russian identity is historically rapidly emerging. In 2004, according to the polls, in
terms of intensity, it was obviously inferior to both ethnic identity and community of people in
terms of views on life, both professional and local identity. Then Russians called themselves 78%
of respondents, and a strong connection (often felt Russians) - 31% (Figure 12.2).

Figure 12.2. The change in the significance of the Russian identity against the background of other
identities, 2004 and 2011,%
<Fig. 12.2>
53

Studies under the guidance of VA. Yadova, used for comparison in the book: Russian identity under transformation
conditions / Otv. Ed. M.K. Gorshkov, N.E. Tikhonova. M., 2005. S. 82.
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By 2011, Russian identity has become not only the most widespread among the most
significant identities, but the feeling of connection with it has become the highest54. If in 2004 the
identification with the country, though not so much, but still was clearly inferior to identifying
people by profession, a commonality in views on life and nationality, in 2011, based on the results
of the study, Russian identity prevailed. And this is not only recorded by the proportion of
respondents who confirmed their identification with the country, but also because the feeling of a
"strong connection" with it has doubled. The connection of times has been restored. In Soviet times,
few people could say that they associate themselves with the RSFSR, and this, by the way,
distinguished them from the inhabitants of other union republics. In the new Russian identity there
is also a pre-Soviet layer of ideas.
If we compare with the states of Western Europe, then the strength of communication with
the country, Russians are now close to the inhabitants of Great Britain, Germany.55
Naturally, the greatest interest is the comparison of Russian identity with ethnic, regional,
local, because it reflects the processes of integration in the country. Identification by nationality
until very recently was not just competing, but prevailing among people in comparison with the
state.
And by the end of the twentieth century, Russian identity as a whole across the country (at
least in regions with a dominant Russian population) began to dominate a little, with 90% of the
population still retaining identity by nationality and by place of residence. However, a strong
connection, as can be seen from Fig. 12.2, on the national and local grounds 50-60% feel, and with
Russian citizens - 72%.
The respondents were asked the clarifying question "Who do you feel more to?". 25% feel
equally in both of them, but the majority of the respondents (47%) considered themselves "more
likely Russians". At the same time, Russians called themselves "Russians" more often than people
of other nationalities (48% vs. 39%).
Thus, the answers to this clarifying question confirmed the established trend.
54
55

The comparisons do not include family ties, which in all studies are the strongest.

For comparison, ISSP 2003 data is taken, where the link is fixed through the answer to the question whether the
respondent feels a connection with his country "very much", "pretty much", "not very much", "I do not feel any
connection" at all. We have combined the first two answers. Our comparisons are not correct to within a percentage,
but reflect a trend.
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There are no significant age differences in identifying themselves as Russians and ethnicity.
A little more identifying with the people of their nationality among the older generation 93%versus 87% among the youth of 18-25 years, which is most likely due to the national
movements they have experienced in the republics of the USSR, the split of the Union and,
possibly, a reaction to the influx of foreign migrants. This is confirmed by the fact that with an
alternative choosing among them the proportion of people who "feel more like Russians" also
turned out to be slightly more (53% versus 44% among 18-25-year-olds).
With such high rates of prevalence of both Russian and ethnic identity, the issue of their
competitiveness is losing its urgency and their compatibility is confirmed. It should be noted that
half of the respondents feel a strong connection with their people (in ethnocultural meaning), and
with the Russian community. By the way the same applies to the local identity, which, judging by
the polls, was almost as widespread and strong.
It would seem that these data testify to the high degree of integration of society and the farfetched nature of the topic of separatism and disunity of the country's population. And in something
it is really so. However, the bases of integration are important. After all, we know about high social
differentiation and political disunity. But it's obvious that there are values and needs of people who
become cementers in society. The very country where you were born and lived, the Motherland is
a value for most people. The idea of it is usually emotionally colored and constitutes that
component of identity, which is called patriotism. "What does it mean for you to be a patriot of
Russia?" - asked during interviews with respondents. In all generations, agreed answers were
received: "Love your country" - 95-99%, strive to improve life in the country 92-97%, "to be proud
of your country 91-97%. This patriotism, of course, is not always critical. With the fact that the
patriot must "Talking about the country the truth, whatever it was", a fifth of the respondents did
not agree; and a third agreed that you should not say that your country has shortcomings.
There is another, unfavorable symptom confirmed by the poll - solidarity is largely based
on grievances. 62% of respondents joined the opinion: "people of my nationality have lost much
in the last 15-20 years". Among Russians this point of view is more common, than among other
nationalities - 64% against 44% respectively. He pays grudges for secession from the Union of
Peoples of the former Union Republics; for national movements, during which Russians were
accused of imperial policy; finally, resentment for the criticism of the past, which only recently
seemed to be a bright future.

147
Hence the sensitivity to the place that the majority in the polyethnic space of the country
should occupy. On the one hand, the older generation still has previous ideas about the norms in
the country, where each person is a "reliable friend and friend", in the part of the middle and the
youngest about the humane values of tolerance, which democracy declares, and on the other hand,
insults for losing status the elder brother, the son of a great nation.
For twenty years, these grievances have not left the consciousness of people. They received
additional fuel at the expense of those feelings that are experienced by other peoples in Europe, in
those countries in which there was a significant and rapid influx of foreigners. Russia in these
years became the third country in the world after the US and Germany on the influx of immigrants.
And this happened against the background of a significantly changed ethnic composition. In the
USSR, Russians accounted for 51%, now in Russia - 80%. In addition, we are experiencing the
consequences of the Chechen crisis (billions of rubles are spent for rebuilding the republic, and in
the end there are rallies "Enough to feed the Caucasus").
In conditions when the politicization of the ethnic factor was added to the objectively
available position in the country by populist politicians, the representation of people about
multinationality as a historical reality of our country was changing. "The fact that people of
different nationalities live in Russia, is it rather an advantage for the development of the country
or is it more a problem?", The respondents were asked. Definitely considered an advantage - 16%.
The position "both" was the most common and scored 41%, while 28% believe that "it is more a
problem". Both Russians and some less often representatives of other nationalities hold such an
opinion (29% and 21% respectively).
Hence, over the past twenty years, the debate on the question of how much Russia is a
common home for the nationalities living in it has not lost its morbidity. From Table. 12.1 shows
how opinions were distributed on this issue since 1995.

Table 12.1 The respondents' opinions how much is Russia a common home for the Russian people,
1995-2011,% 56
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Judgments
Russia must be a state of Russian
people
Russia is a multinational country, but the
Russians, when making up the majority,
should have more rights, for they have the
primary responsibility for the destiny of
the people as a whole.
Russia is a common home for many
peoples, exerting influence on each other.
All the peoples of Russia must have equal
rights, and no one should have any
advantages.
Difficult to answer

1995 1998 2001 2004 2006 2007 2011
11

11

12

17

19

16

14

14

20

20

24

31

31

31

65

64

61

54

50

48

47

10

5

8

6

0

6

8

56 The shares of those who agreed with each of the judgments are indicated.

The fact that the state is a common home for the Russian people, and all of them should
have equal rights, no one should have any advantages, remains the most widespread opinion, but
it receives less and less support every year. In the 90-ies. this was the view of the obvious majority
(64-65%), and in the 2000s. the proportion of its supporters declined: from 61% in 2001 to 47%
in 2011
But the proportion of people who believed that "Russia is a multinational country, but
Russians, making up the majority, should have more rights," has doubled (from 14% to 31%), and
along with those who believe that "Russia should be the state of Russian people "they accounted
for 45% (25% in 1995).
The study showed that open support for the idea of Russian exclusivity is most often
expressed by young people, little educated Russians. In capitals, however, the percentage of "soft
nationalists" (40% versus 30-32% in other types of settlements) is fairly high, convinced that
Russians should be given greater rights than other peoples (Figure 12.3).
All this suggests that the Russians' self-awareness is actualized. 79% share the view that
"in our time a person needs to feel part of his nationality," and 82% attributed themselves to those
who "never forgets about their nationality."
Previous studies of the 90's. even in the republics where Russians are more in contact with
people of other nationalities, they did not record such high indices of the need for affiliation. True,

149
the opinion is rather solidarizing, than reflecting real practice, because at the same time 47%
respond that they rarely think about who they are by nationality.
Solidarity is associated with the politicization of ethnicity, including the discussion in the
country of questions about how our state should be built.
We, too, were interested in the opinion of our citizens about the state structure and policies
related to the country's multinationality.
As for the state structure, most of our citizens do not have a firm opinion on this matter.
42% of respondents believe that "it is necessary to abolish the division of Russia into republics".
This opinion is mainly Russian (among which 43% "for", 56% "against"), since among the
representatives of other peoples it is shared by 27% and among them there are few nationalities
living in the republics according to the sampling conditions. But more importantly, 73% of
Russians share an alternative opinion: "It would be better if the peoples of the republics retained
their independence within the country, autonomy ", and fully confident in the second opinion more
than in the first: 24% against 13%. And among the non-Russians, 79% are of opinion about the
preservation of autonomy.

Figure 12.3. Opinions of respondents of different socio-demographic groups on what should be
the national structure of the Russian state,%
<Fig 12.3>

Thus, it is obvious that the Russians are hesitating about preserving the type of state
structure that we have historically, and representatives of other nationalities, the more living in the
republics, in the majority - against.
In the mood of those who are for the abolition of the republics, most likely more resentment
and fatigue from the need to do something in connection with the multinational nature of the
country. This is evidenced by the agreement of the majority (64%) with the opinion "... it is better
if the peoples who do not want to live peacefully together would have the right to withdraw from
Russia." Support for such an opinion is not just a manifestation of liberalism. Judging by the data,
hardly anyone wants to disintegrate the country, but the terrorist acts in the North Caucasus and in
the Center of the country not only frighten, but also cause resentment, readiness for radical
decisions.
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The Russian identity that has become massive, confident and strong enough, cementing the
Russian political nation, is certainly an important result of the twentieth anniversary, but this
identity is stored in itself by the painful experience of change and the negativism of phobias and
experiences.
After the December events (2010), the public and the authorities expressed concern about
the preservation of interethnic harmony. At the meeting of the State Council, the President of the
Russian Federation stated that without civil peace, interethnic, inter-confessional consent in our
country "The development of the state itself is impossible", "there can be no future for us or for
our children." 57
The data of the conducted research also draw an alarming picture. Half of the respondents
recorded that there were clashes in their locality on the basis of national hostility, and 68% frankly
admitted that they "are irritated or dislike towards representatives of some nationalities." It is
known that we "in the image of the enemy" most often were "Caucasians" the last time, however,
it was proved in studies that if a person has prejudices towards persons of one nationality, in
another situation they will be manifest themselves to others. Most strongly this hostility on ethnic
grounds is due to the fact that people of a different culture behave "as owners on this earth" - 63%.
Another argument of dislike is the difference in "people's behavior, their way of life" - 39%, and
only 1/5 of respondents have a sense of competition in their quest for prestigious jobs. This is quite
understandable, since most of the non-cultural migrants take up work that the local population
does not claim. For twenty years, the readiness to communicate with people of a different
nationality has not changed (Table 12.2).
Table 12.2. Influence of a nationality of the person on the relation to it, 1994-2011,% 58

The influence of nationality in different situations
Affects when choosing a circle of friends
Affects the choice of residence
Affects marriage

58

Shares of those who agreed with each judgment are indicated.

1994
22
43
39

2001
24
36
35

2011
29
40
47
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As we see from the data, there is no need to dramatize interethnic relations (and in this
Dmitry Medvedev was right in assessing the Presidium of the State Council). This seems to be
confirmed by other research centers - the share of bias prejudiced against mass-scale types of
interethnic communication as a whole has been fluctuating for some years in the region of 30%
(data from the Levada Center). Completely agreed answers were received during this study. 89%
of Russians and the same percentage among other nationalities believe that "violence in interethnic
and interreligious disputes is unacceptable," but 44% simultaneously believe that
"Violence is permissible if justice against my people is violated," and 41% agreed that "all means
are good to protect the interests of my people." And among Russians such sentiments are more
common than among other nationalities (43% and 34% respectively).
This is a new situation in the 2000s. In the 1990s, such sentiments were much more frequent
among non-Russians. These answers of the Russians are fully consistent with the actualization of
their ethno-national self-awareness, as discussed above.
Such sentiments of Russians are largely related to the rapid influx of foreign migrants. In
this, Russians do not differ from citizens of other European countries caught up in a similar
situation. Knowing the actions of the Sarkozy government towards the Roma, we asked our
citizens about their attitude towards the forced eviction of people of some nationalities (Figure
12.4).

Figure 12.4. Approval / non-approval of forced eviction of representatives of some nationalities
from the city (village) of residence,%
<Fig. 12.4>

Those who would not approve forced evictions are more than those who approve - 46%
against 39%. But as we see supporters of power actions are quite a lot and, which is especially
alarming, their share is greater among young people. Among those who are 18-25 years old, 46%;
among respondents aged 50-60 years and older - 36-37%. A lot of them among the socially
disadvantaged groups of the population.
But, most often in support of a radical solution of national problems residents of capitals
express themselves - 63% of them support (including 22% unconditionally), the idea of deporting
some nationalities (Figure 12.5).
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Figure 12.5. Approval / No Approval by respondents of different socio-demographic groups of
forced eviction of representatives of some nationalities from the city (village) of residence, %
<Fig. 12.5>

What is the reason for such moods? To say that this is a fairly large group of young people
or residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg – convinced xenophobia, it is impossible. After all, 85%
of young people at this age consider violence in interethnic disputes unacceptable. Combined
negative interethnic installations have about 15%. But the sense of loss in the last 15-20 years, that
is, practically for their still short conscious life, is even more than among people of middle age.
Rather, of course, behind the sense of loss lies their discontent with the practice of the present life
they face, reacting more sharply to both corruptness and social injustice. The complex of social
grievances and dissatisfactions takes the form of ethnonational grievances, infringement of ethnic
feelings. And the events on On December 11, 2010, this was clearly shown in the Manege Square.60
The growing Russian identity, combined with ethnic identity, integrates people, but also
makes us think about the fairness of the existing system of resource allocation, and solidifies
against injustices.
60
A special study, initiated by the Public Chamber, among young people aged 15-30 years, confirmed: 78% consider
performances at the Manezh Square not as nationalistic, but as a protest against corruption. This is the opinion of both
Russians and representatives of other nationalities, and "Caucasians are better suited to corrupt authorities (66%)."
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